BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Information is invoked by biologists in numerous contexts. Animal behaviorists examine the signaling between two organisms or attempt to delimit the structure of the internal map that guides an organism's behavior. Neurobiologists refer to the information passed along neurons and across synapses in brains and nervous systems. The way in which information terminology is used in these contexts has not so far been the main critical focus of philosophers of science. Philosophers of mind discuss animals' representation systems, such as bees' internal maps, and also focus on the way in which brains operate, with a view to shedding light on traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. In contrast, the focus of much discussion in philosophy of biology is the notion of information invoked to explain heredity and development: genetic information. The focus of this article will be on this latter form of biological information.

The ideas that genes are bearers of information and that they contain programs that guide organisms' development are pervasive ones, so much so in biology that they may seem hardly worth examining or questioning. Consulting any biology textbook will reveal that genes contain information in the form of DNA sequences and that this information provides instructions for the production of phenotypes. In contrast, an examination of the philosophical literature on biological information reveals that there are very few philosophers of biology who promote unqualified versions of either of these ideas. To understand how this situation has arisen requires first looking at the role that informational concepts play in biology.

Preliminaries

The two processes that are most relevant to the present context are evolution and development. There was much progress in conceptualizing evolutionary change when it was characterized in terms of changing gene frequencies in the 1930s and 1940s. Many evolutionary biologists discuss evolution entirely from a genetic perspective (see Evolution). After genes were established as the relevant heritable material, the next step was to conceptualize it in terms of molecular structure (see Genetics). In 1953

the structure of DNA was discovered and with this discovery came a mechanism for accounting for the duplication of heritable material and its transmission from one generation to the next. What the discovery of the structure of DNA also ushered in was a research focus for the developing field of molecular biology. An important part of this field is directed at uncovering aspects of organisms' development (see Developmental Biology).

Theory in developmental biology has often diverged from theory in evolutionary biology. Developmental biologists have periodically challenged views and approaches in evolutionary biology, including evolutionary biologists' focus on the gene. With the new techniques in molecular biology came the hope for a unified approach to evolution and development. In this approach, molecular evolutionary biology and molecular developmental biology would work consistently side by side (see Molecular Biology). The processes of development and evolution could be understood from a unified molecular perspective if the component of heredity in evolution were understood to be the passing on of DNA from one generation to the next and the component in development to be the production of proteins from DNA. In this picture, genes were discrete strands of DNA and each was responsible for the production of a particular polypeptide.

The linear structure of DNA and RNA reveals a role that a concept of information can play in understanding heredity and development. The bases in DNA and RNA can be helpfully construed as letters in an alphabet, and the relation between the triplets of letters in the DNA and the resulting polypeptide chain can be construed as a coding relation. So, the DNA contains the code for the polypeptide. Rather than *causing* the production of the relevant protein, the DNA sequence contains the *code* for it.

So, rather than genes being discrete strands of DNA passed on from one generation to the next, they can now be characterized as containing information that is transmitted across generations, and this information is the code for a particular polypeptide. What is relevantly transmitted across generations is the *information* in the DNA, encoded in the unique sequence of bases. Development can now

be conceptualized as the faithful transmission of information from DNA to RNA, via complementary base pairs, and then the passing on of that information into the linear structure of the protein, via the coding relation between triplets of base pairs and specific amino acids. Molecular biologists have introduced terminology that is consistent with this approach: The information in DNA is "replicated" in cell division, "transcribed" from DNA to RNA, and "translated" from RNA into proteins.

Although the process of development includes every part of the life cycle of any particular organism, leading to the whole collection of the organism's phenotypic traits, the discussion that follows focuses on the part of the developmental process operating within cells that starts with the separation of DNA strands and concludes with the production of a protein. In some discussions, genetic information is presented as containing instructions for the production for phenotypic traits such as eyes, but these extensions of the concept present many additional problems to those reviewed below (Godfrey-Smith 2000).

The Pervasive Informational Gene Concept: History and Current Practice

In his provocative *What Is Life?* of 1944, the physicist Erwin Shrödinger said "these chromosomes ... contain in some kind of code-script the entire pattern of the individual's future development and of its functioning in the mature state" (Shrödinger 1944, 20). He went on to explain his terminology:

> In calling the structure of the chromosome fibers a code-script we mean that the all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to which every causal connection lay immediately open, could tell from their structure whether the egg would develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen, into a fly or a maize plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman. (20–21)

As Morange (1998) put it, Shrödinger saw "genes merely as containers of information, as a code that determines the formation of the individual" (75). Shrödinger's proposals were made before the discovery of the structure of DNA. What is important is that his words were read by many of those who were instrumental in the development of molecular biology.

As Sarkar (1996) points out, Watson and Crick were the first to use the term "information" in the context of discussions of the genetic code:

> The phosphate-sugar backbone of our model is completely regular, but any sequence of the pairs of bases

> can fit into the structure. It follows that in a long molecule many different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely that the precise sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical information. (Watson and Crick 1953, 964)

Subsequently, Jacob and Monod also played roles in sustaining Shrödinger's language of the code, helping to reinforce the use of information language in the new field of molecular biology (Keller 2000). By the early 1960s this terminology was established there.

The informational gene concept also became pervasive in the work of theoretical evolutionary biologists. Perhaps the most influential formulation of the concept of heredity in terms of information was that of the evolutionary theorist George Williams. In his influential *Adaptation and Natural Selection*, Williams claims:

> In evolutionary theory, a gene could be defined as any hereditary information for which there is a favorable or unfavorable selection bias equal to several or many times the rate of endogenous change. (Williams 1966, 25)

And, later:

> A gene is not a DNA molecule; it is the transcribable information coded by the molecule. (Williams 1992, 11)

It should now be clear that information terminology is pervasive in disciplines of biology, and also at least somewhat clear why this is the case. There were some historical reasons for adopting the terminology, and there is some utility to the informational concepts. There are, however, some problems associated with construing genes informationally. Many of these problems have been introduced by philosophers of biology, but there has also been much discussion of the informational gene concept within biology.

Problems of the Informational Gene Concept

In several of his recent writings, the evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith has invited philosophers to join the discussion about the informational gene concept. For example, he says that "given the role that ideas drawn from a study of human communication have played, and continue to play, in biology it is strange that so little attention has been paid to them by philosophers of biology. I think that it is a topic that would reward serious study" (Maynard Smith 2000, 192). While not addressing the concept of genetic information directly, philosophers of biology have been attending to these issues indirectly for some time in

working on central problems in the philosophy of biology. For example, the notion of genes as information has played an important role in discussions of reductionism, units of selection, the replicator/interactor distinction, gene/environment interactions, and nativism (see Innate/Acquired Distinction, Population Genetics, Reductionism). Recently, philosophers' focus has turned more explicitly to the informational gene concept. Several philosophers are now engaged in the project of developing a general notion of information that fits best with biologists' aims when they invoke genetic information.

The informational definition of the gene introduced above says that genes contain information that is passed on from one generation to the next, information that codes for particular proteins and polypeptides. As Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) put it: "The classical molecular gene concept is a stretch of DNA that codes for a single polypeptide chain" (132). Genes, in this view, contain information about the phenotype, the protein that is expressed. While most biologists believe that genes contain information about the relevant phenotype, probably no one believes that the information in the genes is sufficient to produce the relevant phenotypes. Even those most routinely chastised for being genetic determinists understand that the information in the gene is expressed only with the aid of a whole host of cellular machinery. As a result, the standard view is that genes contain the relevant or important information guiding the development of the organism. All other cellular machinery merely assists in the expression of the information. One way to put this idea is that genes introduce information to the developmental process, while all other mechanisms make merely a causal contribution to development.

One move that philosophers (and some biologists) have made is to characterize the process of passing on the information in the gene by using terms from information theory. Information theory holds that

> an event carries information about another event to the extent that it is causally related to it in a systematic fashion. Information is thus said to be conveyed over a "channel" connecting the "sender" [or "signal"] with the "receiver" when a change in the receiver is causally related to a change in the sender. (Gray 2001, 190)

In this view information is reduced to causal covariance or systematic causal dependence. Philosophers of biology refer to this characterization of genetic information as the "causal" view. Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) illustrate how the causal information concept could work in the context of molecular biology:

> The idea of information as systematic causal dependence can be used to explain how genes convey developmental information. The genome is the signal and the rest of the developmental matrix provides channel conditions under which the life cycle of the organism contains (receives) information about the genome. (102)

It has been argued that the causal view suffers from serious problems. Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) point out that "it is a fundamental fact of information theory that the role of signal source and channel condition can be reversed" (102) as the signal/channel distinction is simply a matter of causal covariance. Further, the signal/channel distinction is a function of observers' interests. For example, one could choose to hold the developmental history of an organism constant, and from this perspective the organism's phenotype would carry information about its genotype. But if it is instead chosen to "hold all developmental factors other than (say) nutrient quantity constant, the amount of nutrition available to the organism will covary with, and hence also carry information about its phenotype" (102). The causal information concept is lacking, because it cannot distinguish the genes as the singular bearers of important or relevant information. Rather, in this view, genes are just one source of information; aspects of the organism's environment and cellular material also contain information. This position is called the parity thesis (Griffiths and Gray 1994). The parity thesis exposes the need for another information concept that elevates genes alone to the status of information bearers.

Alternative concepts of information have been examined in attempts to respond to this situation; one is referred to variously as intentional, semantic, or teleosemantic information. This notion of information has been defended most forcefully recently by Maynard Smith, and also by philosophers Daniel Dennett (1995) and Kim Sterelny (2000). The term *teleosemantics* is borrowed from "the philosophical program of reducing meaning to biological function (teleology) and then reducing biological function to" natural selection. (A good survey of relations between the philosophy of mind and genetic information concepts is provided in Godfrey-Smith 1999.) This view is articulated in the philosophy of mind as the thesis that a mental state token, such as a sentence, has the biological function of representing a particular state of the world and that this function arose as a result of selection.

Applying this view to the current problem results in the following: "A gene contains information about the developmental outcomes that it was selected to produce" (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 105). Maynard Smith puts the view as: "DNA contains information that has been programmed by natural selection" (Maynard Smith 2000, 190). Here the information in the gene is analogous to a sentence in the head. The gene contains information as a result not just of relevantly causal covariance with the phenotype, but of having the function of producing the relevant phenotype. Defenders of this view claim that this function allows for the information to stay the same even if the channel conditions change, in which case the information in the gene has simply been misinterpreted. This concept could solve the problem of rendering the genes as the sole information bearers, as "if other developmental causes do not contain [teleosemantic] information and genes do, then genes do indeed play a unique role in development" (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 104).

Although the teleosemantic view shows promise, the debate has not ended here. The teleosemantic view opens up a possibility: If a developmental cause—part of the cellular machinery, for example—is found to be heritable and performs the function of producing a particular developmental outcome, then, by definition, it also contains teleosemantic information. Many, including Sarkar (1996, 2000), Griffiths and Gray (1994), Gray (2001), Keller (2000), Sterelny (2000), have argued that indeed there are such mechanisms. These authors draw various conclusions from the demonstrated presence of mechanisms that are not genes, are heritable, and perform the function of producing a specific developmental outcome. Developmental systems theorists such as Griffiths and Gray take these findings to show that teleosemantic information succumbs to the parity thesis also. They go on to argue that no concept of information will distinguish genes as a special contributor to development. Genes are just fellow travelers alongside cellular machinery and the environment in shaping developmental outcomes. Others such as Sarkar and Keller are more cautious and hold out for a concept of information that can distinguish genes as a distinct kind of information bearer. On the other side, Maynard Smith and others have attempted to refine the notion of teleosemantic information to preserve a biological distinction that seems to be important: "The most fundamental distinction in biology is between nucleic acids, with their role as carriers of information, and proteins, which generate the phenotype" (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995, 61).

Three coherent options present themselves to answer the question, Where is biological information found?

1. Information is present in DNA and other nucleotide sequences. Other cellular mechanisms contain no information.
2. Information is present in DNA, other nucleotide sequences, and other cellular mechanisms (for example, cytoplasmic or extracellular proteins), and in many other media—for example, the embryonic environment or components of an organism's wider environment.
3. DNA and other nucleotide sequences do not contain information, nor do any other cellular mechanisms.

These options can be read either ontologically or heuristically. The ontological reading of (1) is that there is a certain kind of information that is present only in DNA and other nucleotide sequences. As a result, any workable concept of information is constrained. The concept adopted cannot be consistent with information of the relevant sort existing in any other media that are causally responsible for an organism's development. The heuristic reading of (1) is that viewing information as present in DNA and other nucleotides is the most reliable guide to good answers in research in developmental molecular biology. The philosophical discussion presented above focuses on developing or challenging accounts of information that are consistent with an ontological reading of (1). For example, Maynard Smith and others, such as Dennett, are defenders of an ontological version of (1).

Many assume that (2) makes sense ontologically only if one adopts a causal information concept, but some of the discussion already referred to indicates that other developmentally relevant media can be construed as containing teleosemantic information. Defenders of the developmental systems theory approach hold a version of (2), as does Sarkar (1996).

Only Waters (2000) seems to have provided a sustained defense of (3). Maynard Smith argues that to construe all processes of development in causal terms without recourse to the concept of genetic information is to relegate them to the hopelessly complex and to implicitly argue that no systematic explanations will be forthcoming (see e.g., Maynard Smith 1998, 5–6). Waters differs, arguing that informational talk in biology is misleading and can entirely be coherently substituted for by causal talk. Waters also argues that it is the intent of most practicing biologists to provide a causal account of development rather than one that invokes information.

In conclusion, philosophers are actively cooperating with theoretical biologists to develop fruitful concepts of information that help make sense of the information terminology widely used in biology. These discussions are as yet inconclusive, and as a result this is a potentially fertile area for future work.

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See also **Evolution; Genetics; Molecular Biology; Population Genetics**

PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY

The philosophy of biology has existed as a distinct subdiscipline within the philosophy of science for about 30 years. The rapid growth of the field has mirrored that of the biological sciences in the same period. Today the discipline is well represented in the leading journals in philosophy of science, as well as in several specialist journals. There have been two generations of textbooks (see Conclusion), and the subject is regularly taught at the undergraduate as well as the graduate level. The current high profile of the biological sciences and the obvious philosophical issues that arise in fields as diverse as molecular genetics and conservation biology suggest that the philosophy of biology will remain an exciting field of enquiry for the foreseeable future.

Three Kinds of Philosophy of Biology

Philosophers have engaged with biological science in three quite distinct ways. Some have looked to biology to test general theses in philosophy of science (see Laws of Nature). Others have engaged with conceptual puzzles that arise within