VOLUME 10 (1997), ISSUE 1

Manuscripts:

RICK GRUSH
The architecture of representation

• Abstract: In this article I outline, apply, and defend a theory of natural representation. The main consequences of this theory are: 1) representational status is a matter of how physical entities are used, and specifically is not a matter of causation, nomic relations with the intentional object, or information; 2) there are genuine (brain-)internal representations; 3) such representations are really representations, and not just farcical pseudo-representations, such as attractors, principal components, state-space partitions, or what-have-you; and 4) the theory allows us to sharply distinguish those complex behaviors which are genuinely cognitive from those which are merely complex and adaptive.

MICHAEL R.W. DAWSON, DAVID A. MEDLER, & ISTVAN S.N. BERKELEY
PDP networks can provide models that are not mere implementations of classical theories

• Abstract: There is widespread belief that connectionist networks are dramatically different from classical or symbolic models. However, connectionists rarely test this belief by interpreting the internal structure of their nets. A new approach to interpreting networks was recently introduced by Berkeley et al 1995. The current paper examines two implications of applying this method: (1) that the internal structure of a connectionist network can have a very classical appearance, and (2) that this interpretation can provide a cognitive theory that cannot be dismissed as a mere implementation.

SARA WORLEY
Belief and consciousness

• Abstract: In this paper, I argue that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires to subjects like zombies or (present day) computers which do not have phenomenal consciousness. In order to ascribe beliefs, we must distinguish between personal and subpersonal content. There may be states in my brain which represent the array of light intensities on my retina, but these states are not beliefs, because they are merely subpersonal. I argue that we cannot distinguish between personal and subpersonal content without reference to phenomenal consciousness. I argue for this by examining two attempt to account for belief without reference to phenomenal consciousness, functionalism and Dennett's patterns of behavior theory, and showing that they both fail. In the course of the arguments that these attempts fail, I develop some positive reasons for believing that phenomenal consciousness is indeed necessary.

DANIEL STATMAN
Hypocrisy and self-deception

• Abstract: Hypocrites are generally regarded as morally-corrupt, cynical egoists who consciously and deliberately deceive others in order to further their own interests. The purpose of my essay is to present a different view. I argue that hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception and, therefore, that real hypocrites are hard to find. One reason for this merging of hypocrisy into self-deception is that a consistent and conscious deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites. The best way for them to achieve their ends would be to believe in the deception, thereby no only deceiving others but also themselves. If my thesis is sound, we ought to be more cautious in ascribing hypocrisy to people, and less harsh in our toward hypocrites.

R.C. MORRIS
Intentions, self-monitoring and abnormal experiences

• Abstract: Conscious awareness of intentionality is considered to be a product of specialized monitoring processes which distinguish intentional, goal-directed actions from unintentional, passive/reactive actions. When goals are not met or unfavorable conditions arise, this ability to distinguish intentional and unintentional enables us to direct adaptive efforts towards either changing plans and goals or towards altering the environment. The formulation is discussed in relation to monitoring theories of consciousness and the concept of ?locus of control?, and is developed to explain several common psychological disorders in terms of dysfunctional monitoring of intentions. It is suggested that it could provide a theoretical basis for psychological treatment methods.

Continuing Discussion: Essentialism and emotions

TIM DALGLEISH
An anti-anti-essentialist view of the emotions: A reply to Kupperman

• Abstract: Kupperman (1995) advances an anti-essentialist view of emotions in which he suggests that there can be emotion without feeling or affect, emotion without corresponding motivation, and emotions without an intentional relation to an object such that the emotion is about that object in some way. In this reply to Kupperman's essay, I suggest a number of problems with his rejection of the essentialist position. I argue that in his discussion of feelings Kupperman is crucially not clear about the distinction between the ascription of emotions by others versus the experience of emotions by an individual. Furthermore, I also question his analysis of the role of linguistic empiricism in philosophy and psychology. With respect to Kupperman's analysis of intentionality, I argue that he confuses the ability to readily identify intentional objects with the issue of their actual existence. Finally, I suggest that Kupperman confuses the concepts of action and motivation in his discussion of motivation.

JOEL J. KUPPERMAN
Felt and unfelt emotions: A rejoinder to Dalgleish

• Abstract: There is much worth discussing in Tim Dalgleish's reply to my "An anti-essentialist view of emotions," including some things I am sympathetic to. However, I will confine myself to two areas of difference.

Review Essays:

BERNARD W. KOBES
Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of JANET METCALF & ARTHUR P. SHIMAMURA's Metacognition: Knowing about knowing

• Abstract: The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principled findings reported in this collection.

CLIFF A. HOOKER
Dynamical systems in development: Review essay of LINDA V. SMITH & ESTHER THELEN's A dynamic systems approach to development: Applications

• Abstract: This book focuses on showing how the ideas central to the new wave of dynamic systems studies may also form the basis for a new and distinctive theory of human development where both global order and local variability in behavior emerge together from the same organizing dynamical interactions. This also sharpens our understanding of the weaknesses of the traditional formal, structuralist theories. Conversely, dynamical models have their own matching set of problems, many of which are consciously explored here. Less readily acknowledged, the youthfulness of this field means that many of the studies presented here struggle to pass beyond speculative metaphor. Nonetheless, the field is shown to be one of vigor, intelligence, and great promise.

Book Reviews:

JAMES H. FETZER
Review of DANIEL DENNETT's Kinds of minds

HENRY CRIBBS
Review of DANIEL DENNETT's Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life

MORTEN H. CHRISTIANSEN
Review of MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA's The cognitive neurosciences

PEGGY DesAUTELS
Review of EDWARD M. HUNDERT's Lessons from an optical illusion: On nature and nurture, knowledge and values

DOUGLAS G. WINBLAD
Review of DAVID G. STERN's Wittgenstein on mind and language

PETE MANDIK
Review of MICHAEL TYE's Ten problems of consciousness: A representational theory of the phenomenal mind

WAYNE CHRISTENSEN
Review of K.M. FORD, CLARK GLYMOUR, & P.J. HAYES' Android epistemology

DAVID BLUMENFELD
Review of ALFRED R. MELE's Autonomous agents