VOLUME 11 (1998), ISSUE 1

Manuscripts:

XIANG CHEN, HANNE ANDERSEN, & PETER BARKER
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology

• Abstract: In a previous article we have shown that Kuhn's theory of concepts is independently supported by recent research in cognitive psychology. In this paper we propose a cognitive re-reading of Kuhn's cyclical model of scientific revolutions: all of the important features of the model may now be seen as consequences of a more fundamental account of the nature of concepts and theory dynamics. We begin by examining incommensurability, the central theme of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, according to two different cognitive models of concept representation. We provide new support for Kuhn's mature views that incommensurability can be caused by changes in only a few concepts, that even incommensurable conceptual systems can be rationally compared, and that scientific change of the most radical sort-the type labeled revolutionary in earlier studies-does not have to occur holistically and abruptly, but can be achieved by a historically more plausible accumulation of smaller changes. We go on to suggest that the parallel accounts of concepts found in Kuhn and in cognitive science lead to a new understanding of the nature of normal science, of the transition from normal science to crisis, and of scientific revolutions. The same account enables us to understand how scientific communities split to create groups supporting new paradigms, and to resolve various outstanding problems. In particular, we can identify the kind of change needed to create a revolution rather precisely. This new analysis also suggests reasons for the unidirectionality of scientific change.

MUHAMMAD A. KHALIDI
Incommensurability in cognitive guise

• Abstract: The idea has gained currency in recent years that the "child is the parent of the scientist."1 The general claim, which has been elaborated by philosophers of science and developmental psychologists alike, is that there are some similarities in the manner in which children develop their concepts and theories about the world and the ways in which scientists do so in the course of the history of science. A more specific thesis that has been taken up by some of these writers is that theories at successive developmental stages in both domains are incommensurable with their predecessors. The idea of incommensurability was first proposed by Paul Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn for the history of science; their claim was that theories or paradigms separated by scientific revolutions are incommensurable with one another. Some developmental psychologists have found evidence for the incommensurability thesis in their investigations into conceptual change in the evolving belief systems of young children. In this paper, I will criticize two of these recent attempts. The new cognitive elaborations of incommensurability do not convincingly support the ideas first put forward by Kuhn and Feyerabend and they do not give us good reasons for accepting a form of conceptual relativism among adults and children. A brief survey of some of Kuhn's and Feyerabend's views on incommensurability will be followed by elaborations of their ideas by two cognitive psychologists, Susan Carey and Alison Gopnik. After questioning the conclusions of these psychologists and suggesting some reinterpretations of their evidence, some proposals will be made for understanding the phenomenon of conceptual change or development.

STEVE MATTHEWS
Personal identity, multiple identity disorder, and moral personhood

• Abstract: Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped using quasi-psychological states even with the addition of the coherence condition. Second, I argue that there is something right about the coherence condition, and a major task of this paper is to identify its proper theoretical role. I do so by reflection on integration therapies for people with multiple personality disorder (MPD). The familiar distinction between the moral and the metaphysical concept of the person is developed alongside such reflection. Connecting these two issues I argue that coherence acts as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity, but that the normative dimension of personhood is not essential to our notion of a person tout court.

Review Essay:

CAMERON SHELLEY
Consciousness, symbols and aesthetics: A just-so story and its implications in SUSANNE LANGER's Mind: An essay on human feeling

• Abstract: Consciousness is a central theme of Susanne Langer's three-volume work Mind: An essay on human feeling. Langer proposes an evolutionary history of consciousness in order to establish a biological vocabulary for discussing the subject. This vocabulary is based on the qualities of organic processes rather than generic material objects. Her historical scenario and new terminology suggest that Langer views the "cash value" of consciousness in terms of symbolic thinking and aesthetics. This paper provides an overview of Langer's proposed evolutionary scenario of consciousness, along with an examination of her process-oriented philosophy of mind. It is suggested that Langer's basic ideas are importantly similar to those present in dynamical systems theory. As research on consciousness in dynamical systems theory is still young, researchers in this field may find in Langer's work ideas for future exploration, particularly in its connection with aesthetics.

Book Reviews:

JAY GARFIELD
Review of VALERIE G. HARDCASTLE's How to build a theory in cognitive science

COLIN ALLEN
Review of PETER CARRUTHERS' Language, thought, and consciousness

GARETH MATTHEWS
Review of JOHN FLAVELL, FRANCES GREEN, & ELEANOR FLAVELL's Young children's knowledge about thinking

PAUL GRIFFITHS
Review of MICHAEL STOCKER & ELIZABETH HEGEMAN's Valuing emotions

DAVID PITT
Review of LYNNE RUDDER BAKER's Explaining attitudes

ANDY CLARK
Review of STEVEN MITHEN's The prehistory of the mind: A search for the origins of art, religion, and science

J.D. TROUT
Review of PETER JUSCZYK's The discovery of spoken language

JUSTIN LEIBER
Review of ROBERT BARKSKY's Noam Chomsky: A life of dissent