VOLUME 11 (1998), ISSUE 4

Manuscripts:

PAUL THAGARD
Ethical coherence

• Abstract: This paper explores the ethical relevance of a precise new characterization of coherence as maximization of satisfaction of positive and negative constraints. A coherence problem can be stated by specifying a set of elements to be accepted or rejected along with sets of positive and negative constraints that incline pairs of elements to be accepted together or rejected together. Computationally tractable and psychologically plausible algorithms are available for determining the acceptance and rejection of elements in a way that reliably approximates coherence maximization. This paper shows how justification of ethical principles and particular judgments can be accomplished by taking into account deductive, explanatory, analogical, and deliberative coherence.

KEITH FRANKISH
A matter of opinion

• Abstract: This paper sets out the case for a two-level theory of human psychology. It takes its start from Daniel Dennett's distinction between belief and opinion, arguing that it has the power to account for a number of tensions within our commonsense concept of belief. It argues, however, that Dennett's account is seriously inadequate, particularly in its treatment of the role of opinion in practical reasoning. The paper goes on to sketch an alternative proposal which retains the virtues of Dennett's suggestion, while providing a richer and more satisfying account of the cognitive role of opinion.

D.K. WALTON & T. STRONGMAN
Neonate Crusoes, the private language argument, and psychology

• Abstract: This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability are explored as they appear in both philosophy and psychology.

CRAIG DeLANCEY
Real emotions

• Abstract: I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction of the desires that could plausibly be said to motivate the agent. As a contrast to a realist position about emotions I examine interpretationist theories of mind, using Dennett and Davidson as examples, and show that the emotional actions in question will fail to be explained by these theories. In conclusion, I provide one weak version of a natural realist view of emotions, and show how it succeeds where interpretationism fails.

MAURICE K.D. SCHOUTEN & HUIB LOOREN de JONG
Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision

• Abstract: The doctrine of eliminative materialism holds that belief-desire psychology is massively referentially disconnected. We claim, however, that it is not at all obvious what it means to be referentially (dis)connected. The two major accounts of reference both lead to serious difficulties for eliminativism: it seems that elimination is either impossible or omnipresent. We explore the idea that reference fixation is a much more local, partial, and context-dependent process than was supposed by the classical accounts. This pragmatic view suggests that elimination is not the prime model for understanding the complex relations between the mind and brain sciences, and that we have little ground for concluding that in general psychological kinds do not exist. We suggest that reference changes are better seen as continuous rather than completely eliminative.

SCOTT SEHON
Connectionism and the causal theory of action explanation

• Abstract: It is widely assumed that commonsense psychological explanations of human action are a species of causal explanation. I argue against this construal, drawing on Ramsey et al.'s paper "Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology." I argue that if certain connectionist models are correct, then mental states cannot be identified with functionally-discrete causes of behavior, and I respond to some recent attempts to deny this claim. However, I further contend that our commonsense psychological practices are not committed to the falsity of such connectionist models. The paper concludes that commonsense psychology is not committed to the identification of mental states with functionally-discrete causes of behavior, and hence that commonsense psychology is not committed to the causal account of action explanation.

Book Reviews:

KEITH BUTLER
Review of NORTON NELKIN's Consciousness and the origins of thought

HAROLD I. BROWN
Review of C.A. HOOKER's Reason, realism, and regulation: Toward a regulatory systems theory of reason and evolutionary epistemology

WILLIAM RAMSEY
Review of ROBERT McCAULEY's The Churchland's and their critics

DON GUSTAFSON
Review of STEPHEN STICH's Deconstructing the mind

DIANE BEALS
Review of ULRIC NEISSER & D.A. JOPLING's The conceptual self in context: Culture, experience, self-understanding

JANICE NUCKOLLS
Review of BRADD SHORE's Culture in mind, Cognition, culture, and the problem of meaning

VALERIE G. HARDCASTLE
Review of WILLIAM H. CALVIN's The cerebral code: Thinking a thought in the mosaics of the mind

ADINA ROSKIES
Review of DONALD MENDER's The myth of neuropsychiatry: A look at paradoxes, physics, and the human brain