VOLUME 12 (1999), ISSUE 3

Manuscripts:

MAURICE K.D. SCHOUTEN & HUIB LOOREN de JONG
Reduction, elimination, and levels: The case of the LTP-learning link

• Abstract: We argue in this paper that so-called new-wave reductionism fails to capture the nature of the interlevel relations between psychology and neuroscience. Bickle (1995; 1998) has claimed that a (bottom-up) reduction of the psychological concepts of learning and memory to the concepts of neuroscience has in fact already been accomplished. An investigation of current research on the phenomenon of long-term potentiation reveals that this claim overstates the facts. Both the psychological and the neural concepts involved have not yet stabilized and face further correction under the influence of both bottom-up and top-down selection pressures. In addition, psychological concepts often refer to functions, and functions are indispensable and irreducible. Function ascriptions pick out objective patterns involving historical factors and distal goals. This view of functions implies that psychological facts cannot be simply read off from the neurophysiological facts. Although psychological theorizing is constrained by neurophysiology (and vice versa), psychology remains distinct at least to some degree.

ADAM WAGER
The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationalism

• Abstract: Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia problem, are counterexamples to externalist versions of representationism.

DAVID COLE
I don't think so: Pinker on the mentalese monopoly

• Abstract: Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The Language Instinct (1994) for his widely-shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think.

Review Essay:

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON
Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism

• Abstract: John Bickle's Psychoneural Reduction: the New Wave aims to resurrect reductionism within philosophy of mind. He develops a new model of scientific reduction, geared to enhancing our understanding of how theories in neuroscience and cognitive science are interrelated. I put this discussion in context, and assess the prospects for New Wave Reductionism, both as a general model of scientific reduction and as an attempt to defend reductionism in the philosophy of mind.

Symposium: Rational Choice Theory

PETER ROELOFSMA
Symposium introduction

• Abstract: This symposium presents three papers that address current topics in the ongoing debate of rational choice theory. Read & Roelofsma discuss an aspect of decision-making largely ignored by psychologists and economists: the power of temptation and the difficulty of self-control. The paper of Zeelenberg addresses another issue that it is part and parcel of everyday life but not in everyday models of rational choice: the role of regret in human choice. Fontana & Gerrard outline a radical Keynesian theory of decision-making under uncertainty. The authors in this symposium are all currently affiliated with economic departments, but their research draws heavily on experimental psychology and cognitive science.

GIUSEPPE FONTANA & BILL GERRARD
Disequilibrium states and adjustment processes: Towards a historical-time analysis of behavior under uncertainty

• Abstract: It is argued that Keynes, Loasby and Post-Keynesian economics share a common methodological outlook in three key respects: the need for a thicker conceptualisation of uncertainty, the importance of historical-time analysis and the realist imperative to identify causal structures. Much of the focus of Post Keynesian economics has been on the critique of mainstream economic theory. It is stressed that there is an urgent need to move on to the more constructive task of developing the insights of Keynes and Loasby. Keynes's method of shifting equilibrium provides the basis for this constructive task. Equilibrium can be a useful theoretical device in logical-time analysis provided that the necessity of encompassing that analysis with a realist, historical-time analysis is recognised. Furthermore, the concept of equilibrium must not be restricted to the specific classical concept of a market-clearing position of rest. This specific concept of equilibrium is only appropriate for the analysis of allocative processes. Keynes's method of shifting equilibrium provides the outline of a method of analysis which attempts to use the concept of equilibrium within a more general, historical-time framework to provide an understanding of how uncertainty and the acquisition of new knowledge affects economic behaviour and impacts on the actual course of events.

MARCEL ZEELENBERG
The use of crying over spilled milk: A note on the rationality and functionality of regret

• Abstract: This article deals with the rationality and functionality of the existence of regret and its influence on decision making. First regret is defined as a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently. Next it is discussed whether this experience can be considered rational and it is argued that rationality only applies to what we do with our regrets, not to the experience itself. Then, research is reviewed showing that both the anticipation of future regret and the experience of retrospective regret influence behavior. The influence of anticipated regret can be considered rational as long as the decision maker can accurately predict the regret that may result from the decision. The influence of experienced regret cannot be considered rational, since decisions should be based on future outcomes, not historical ones. However, influence of experienced regret can be called functional since it may result in increased learning from our mistakes.

DANIEL READ & PETER ROELOFSMA
Hard choices and weak wills: The theory of intrapersonal dilemma

• Abstract: Social dilemmas occus when individuals make choices that are in their own best interest but not in the interest of society as a whole. Intrapersonal dilemmas occur when people make choices that are in the best interest of themselves at the moment of choice, but not in the best interest of themselves in the long run. A number of writers have observed that we can usefully model this self-defeating behavior by treating each individual as an aggregate of 'selves' which have competing interests, like the individual selves in a population. We undertake to synthesize and extend these contributions, applying the theory of intrapersonal dilemmas to addiction and procrastination, and discuss how the concept of multiple selves can explain why people attempt to control their behavior by imposing costs or constraints on themselves in the future, and how it can also help us develop new strategies of (personal) behavior control.

Book Reviews:

KENT BACH
Review of JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ's The paradox of self-consciousness

MARGARET WILSON
Review of MARK MARSCHARK, PATRICIA SIPLE, DIANE LILLO-MARTIN, RUTH CAMPBELL, & VICTORIA EVERHART's Relations of language and thought: The view from sign language and deaf children

JUSTIN LEIBER
Review of SUE SAVAGE-RUMBAUGH, STUART G. SHANKER, & TALBOT J. TAYLOR's Apes, language, and the human mind