VOLUME 13 (2000), ISSUE 1
- Manuscripts:
- W.D. CHRISTENSEN & C.A. HOOKER
An interactivist-constructivist approach to intelligence: Self-directed
anticipative learning
- Abstract: This paper outlines an
original interactivist-constructivist (I-C) approach to modeling intelligence
and learning as a dynamical embodied form of adaptiveness and explores some
applications of I-C to understanding the way cognitive learning is realized
in the brain. Two key ideas for conceptualizing intelligence within this
framework are developed. These are: (i) intelligence is centrally concerned
with the capacity for coherent, context-sensitive, self-directed management
of interaction; (ii) the primary model for cognitive learning is anticipative
skill construction. Self-directedness is a capacity for integrative process
modulation which allows a system to 'steer' itself through its world by
anticipatively matching its own viability requirements to interaction with
its environment. Because the adaptive interaction processes required of
intelligent systems are too complex for effective action to be prespecified
(e.g. genetically) learning is an important component of intelligence. A
model of self-directed anticipative learning (SDAL) is formulated based
on interactive skill construction, and argued to constitute a central constructivist
process involved in cognitive development. SDAL illuminates the capacity
of intelligent learners to start with the vague, poorly defined, problems
typically posed in realistic learning situations and progressively refine
them, transforming them into problems with sufficient structure to guide
the construction of a solution. Finally, some of the implications of I-C
for modeling of the neuronal basis of intelligence and learning are explored;
in particular, Quartz and Sejnowski's recent neural constructivism (NC)
paradigm, enriched by Montague and Sejnowski's dopaminergic model of anticipative-predictive
neural learning, is assessed as a promising, but incomplete, contribution
to this approach. The paper concludes with a four-fold reflection on the
divergence in cognitive modeling philosophy between the I-C and the traditional
computational information processing (CIP) approaches.
- AARRE LAASKSO & GARRISON COTTRELL
Content and cluster analysis: Assessing representational similarity in
neural systems
- Abstract: If connectionism is to
be an adequate theory of mind, we must have a theory of representation for
neural networks that allows for individual differences in weighting and
architecture while preserving sameness, or at least similarity, of content.
In this paper we propose a procedure for measuring sameness of content of
neural representations. We argue that the correct way to compare neural
representations is through analysis of the distances between neural activations,
and we present a method for doing so. We then use the technique to demonstrate
empirically that different artificial neural networks trained by backpropagation
on the same categorization task, even with different representational encodings
of the input patterns and different numbers of hidden units, reach states
in which representations at the hidden units are similar. We discuss how
this work provides a rebuttal to Fodor & Lepore's critique of Paul Churchland's
state space semantics.
- FRANCISCO C. GARZON
State space semantics and conceptual simularity: Reply to Churchland
- Abstract: Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore
(1992; 1996) have launched a powerful attack against Paul Churchland's connectionist
theory of semantics-aka State Space Semantics. In one part of their attack,
Fodor & Lepore argue that the architectural and functional idiosyncrasies
of connectionist networks preclude us from articulating a notion of conceptual
similarity applicable to State Space Semantics. Aarre Laakso & Gary Cottrell
(1998; forthcoming) have recently run a number of simulations on simple
feedforward networks, and applied a mathematical technique for measuring
conceptual similarity in the representational spaces of those networks.
Laakso & Cottrell contend that their results decisively refute Fodor & Lepore's
criticisms. Paul Churchland (1998) goes further. He uses Laakso & Cottrell's
neurosimulations to argue that connectionism does furnish us with all we
need to construct a robust theory of semantics and a robust theory of translation.
In this paper I shall argue that whereas Laakso & Cottrell's neurocomputational
results may provide us with a rebuttal of Fodor and Lepore's argument, Churchland's
conclusion is far too optimistic. In particular, I shall try to show that
connectionist modeling does not provide any objective criterion for achieving
a one-to-one accurate translational mapping across networks.
- Discussion: Pain and Preference
- STEPHANIE BEARDMAN
The choice between current and retrospective evaluations of pain (This
paper was the winner of the 1999 James Prize, SPP)
- Abstract: Daniel Kahneman and his
colleagues have made an interesting discovery about people's preferences.
In several experiments, subjects underwent two separate ordeals of pain,
identical except that one ended with an added amount of diminishing pain.
When asked to evaluate these episodes after experiencing both, subjects
generally preferred the longer episode—even though it had a greater
objective quantity of pain. This data raises an ethical question about whether
to respect such preferences when acting on another's behalf. John Broome
thinks that it is wrong to add extra pain in order to satisfy a person's
preference for a better ending. His explanation for this intuition is that
pain is intrinsically bad. I argue against this explanation, and raise several
doubts about the moral intuition Broome endorses. In doing so, I offer alternate
interpretations of Kahneman's data, and show that these each yield different
values which are relevant to the ethical question.
- DON GUSTAFSON
Our choice between actual and remembered pain and our flawed preferences
- Abstract: In Stephanie Beardman's
discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman & Tversky and Kahneman et
al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that
an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for
pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur
with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain
sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman,
et al. data. I cite some of these theoretical and empirical reasons. I engage
in some speculation as to why preferences for pain experiences, which harbor
the Peak and Ending profile, make biological sense. Given the results from
the pain sciences and the clinical practices based in them, I conclude that
the medical ethical issue Kahneman raises and Beardman tries to solve is
not a pressing moral demand on medical practitioners.
- STEPHANIE BEARDMAN
Response to Gustafson's comments
- Abstract: This area is rich, and
Donald Gustafson reminds us of how interesting and complex are the issues
raised by the studies performed by Kahneman and his colleagues. He has offered
a sympathetic empirical extension of my paper. My discussion left out many
issues that need to be sorted out, especially concerning the nature and
measurement of pain itself.
- Continuing Discussion:
- CHARLES DUNLOP
Searle's unconscious mind
- Abstract: In his book The Rediscovery
of the Mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have
first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person.
He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual
shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious
first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails
insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual
shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation.
- Book Reviews:
- SHAUN GALLAGHER
Review of S.L. HURLEY's Consciousness in action
- HOWARD C. NUSSBAUM
Review of DOMINIC MASSARO's Talking faces
- THOMAS POLGER
Review of JAEGWON KIM's Mind in a physical world
- JING ZHU
Review of W.F.G. HASELAGER's Cognitive science and folk psychology: The
right frame of mind
- CHRISTOPHER GAUKER
Review of JAN NUYTS & ERIC PEDERSON's Language and conceptualization