VOLUME 14 (2001), ISSUE 2

Manuscripts:

WILLIAM S. WILKERSON
Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: The interpretive moment

• Abstract: The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization—that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved.

CHARLES NUSSBAUM
Troubles with the causal homeostatic theory of reference

• Abstract: While purely causal theories of reference have provided a plausible account of the meanings of names and natural kind terms, they cannot handle vacuous theoretical terms. The causal homeostasis theory can, but incurs other difficulties. Theories of reference that are intensional and not purely causal tend to be molecularist or holist. Holist theories threaten transtheoretic reference, whereas molecularist theories must supply a principled basis for selecting privileged meaning-determining relations between terms. The causal homeostasis theory is a two-factor (causal and intensional) molecularist theory, but it fails to provide such a principled basis, and collapses into holism. A naturalistic, non-foundationalist holism that deploys strategies of intertheoretic reduction and coevolutionary pluralism can, however, yield a credible version of transtheoretic reference.

PETE MANDIK
Mental Representation and the subjectivity of consciousness

• Abstract: Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of the consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the Knowledge Argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit perspectives or points of view. I argue that the resultant account of subjectivity provides a basis for the strongest response physicalists can give to the knowledge argument.

CHRISTOPHER D. VIGER
Locking on to the language of thought

• Abstract: I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to serve as the elements of the medium of thought.

Review essays:

Brandon N. Towl
Dynamics under scrutiny—Or, how to teach old problems new tricks: A critical review of ALICIA JUARRERO's Dynamics in action

• Abstract: Alicia Juarrero's Dynamics in action is an attempt to bring dynamical systems theory to bear on action theory. Juarrero claims that the vocabulary and examples from dynamical systems theory can help us resolve some pressing problems in action theory, including the problems of extended action and disrupted causal chains. In the process, Juarrero calls for a return to an Aristotelean plurality of causes and a serious scrutiny of modern Humean/positivist science as she sees it. Although her book has some inaccuracies and fails to convince the skeptical reader, it provides an alternative point of view from which to launch further studies.

SELMER BRINGSJORD
Are we evolved computers? A critical review of STEVEN PINKER's How the mind works

• Abstract: Steven Pinker's How The Mind Works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution—end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey Socrates' command, are left alone to wander in the labyrinth of their benighted speculation forever. Unfortunately, though HTMW is to this point the crowning attempt of psychology to make systematic sense of persons by integrating everything relevant science knows, the book fails—and it fails so fundamentally and irremediably that we would do well to wonder anew whether we should supplant the basic view it promotes with what I call the super-mind hypothesis: the view that though mere animals are evolved computers, persons are more.

Book Reviews:

THOMAS W. POLGER
Review of DANIEL C. DENNETT's Brainchildren: Essays on designing minds

JOSE BERMUDEZ
Review of CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE's Being known