VOLUME 15 (2002), ISSUE 2

Manuscripts:

LEE SPECTOR
Hierarchy helps it work that way

• Abstract: Jerry Fodor (2000) argues, in The mind doesn't work that way, that the computational theory of mind is undermined by the pervasive context sensitivity of human cognition. His objections can be easily met, however, by noting the properties of appropriately structured representation hierarchies.

JERMOME C. WAKEFIELD
Broad vs. narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases

• Abstract: A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of "Frege cases"—cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though 'a' and 'b' have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor (1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases.

GURPREET RATTAN
Tacit knowledge of grammar: A reply to Knowles

• Abstract: I defend the non-cognitivist outlook on knowledge of grammar from the criticisms leveled against it by Jonathan Knowles. The first part of the paper is largely critical. First, I argue that Knowles's argument against Christopher Peacocke & Martin Davies's non-cognitivist account of the psychological reality of grammar fails, and thus that no reason has been given to think that cognitivism is integral to an understanding of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics. Second, I argue that cognitivism is philosophically problematic. In particular, I argue (a) that Knowles misunderstands Stephen Stich's and Gareth Evans's points about inferential integration; and (b) that Knowles misunderstands the philosophical status and demands of Evans's Generality Constraint. In the final, non-critical part of the paper, I try to show that the Stich and Evans's constraints, together with a Self-Knowledge Constraint, are genuine constitutive constraints by showing how they have rationality as their underlying organizing principle. I argue further that recognizing the constitutive character of these constraints allows one to distinguish two kinds of psychological explanation; in this sense, the constraints mark a genuine boundary in our theorizing about the mind.

Review Essays:

DAVID LUMSDEN
Crossing the symbolic threshold: A critical review of TERRENCE DEACON's The symbolic species

• Abstract: Terrence Deacon's views about the origin of language are based on a particular notion of a symbol. While the notion is derived from Peirce's semiotics, it diverges from that source and needs to be investigated on its own terms in order to evaluate the idea that the human species has crossed the symbolic threshold. Deacon's view is defended from the view that symbols in the animal world are widespread and from the extreme connectionist view that they are not even to be found in humans. Deacon's treatment of symbols involves a form of holism, as a symbol needs to be part of a system of symbols. He also appears to take a realist view of symbols. That combination of holism and realism makes the threshold a sharp threshold, which makes it hard to explain how the threshold was crossed. This difficulty is overcome if we take a mild realist position towards symbols, in the style of Dennett. Mild realism allows intermediate stages in the crossing but does not undermine Deacon's claim that the threshold is difficult to cross or the claim that it needs to be crossed quickly.

JOHN SARNECKI & MATTHEW SPONHEIMER
Why neanderthals hate poetry: A critical review of STEVEN MITHEN's The prehistory of mind

• Abstract: The significance of historical advances in human development has been widely debated within cognitive science. Steven Mithen's recent book, The Prehistory of Mind, presents an archeologist's attempt to explain the details of cognitive development within the framework of modern anthropology and cognitive psychology. We argue that Mithen's attempt fails for a number of different reasons. The relationship between the archeological evidence he considers and his conclusions is problematic. We maintain that it is difficult to draw biological conclusions from strictly behavioural artifactual evidence. To buttress his claims, Mithen borrows heavily from the very cognitive science literature to which he hopes to contribute. As a consequence, his analysis of the archeological evidence cannot promote a particular cognitive theory, since his interpretation is only as strong as those theories from which he borrows. We are also concerned that the specific details of Mithen's program are equally problematic. Mithen's claim that modular intelligences did not exist outside of hominid evolution is likely false and unwarranted. As a consequence, we argue that the central component of his claim that the uniquely human feature of our development, the move from modular to fluid minds, depends on poorly defined distinctions between a wide range of mental processes. Whether we can accept Mithen's characterization of these claims will depend, we argue, on how he chooses to clarify these terms. We suggest that the various choices will be difficult to reconcile with his theory. Moreover, we suggest that the phenomena that Mithen hopes to explain in human development cannot be explained strictly in terms of analogical reasoning. We nevertheless find Mithen's attempt at answering these questions to be both a constructive and fascinating foray into what is an under-explored topic.

ROBERT THOMAS
Idea analysis of algebraic groups: A critical review of GEORGE LAKOFF & RAFAEL NÚÑEZ's Where mathematics comes from

• Abstract: The study that George Lakoff & Rafael Nunez call "idea analysis" and begin in their recent book Where mathematics comes from is intended to dissect mathematical concepts into their mathematical parts, where metaphor is used in the cognitive-science sense promoted in Lakoff & Johnson's Metaphors we live by and subsequent works by each of them and together. Lakoff & Nunuz's analysis of the (modern) algebraic concept of group is based on the attribution to contemporary mathematics of what will be widely recognizable by their name for it, the folk theory of essences. I argue that this philosophical basis for their analysis is spurious, and supply an alternative analysis of the same concept within their "metaphorical" paradigm but without essences. This analysis, which I hope is more viable than theirs, is intended to support the general applicability of the paradigm by freeing it from outmoded philosophical luggage.

Book Reviews:

PETER W. ROSS
Review of AUSTEN CLARK's A theory of sentience

PHILIP ROBBINS
Review of PETER GÄRDENFORS' Conceptual spaces

KENT BACH
Review of ALFRED MELE's Self-deception unmasked

ISTVAN BERKELEY
Review of GARY F. MARCUS' The algebraic mind: Integrating connectionism and cognitive science

STEVEN MANDELKER
Review of GEORGE BOTTERILL & PETER CARRUTHERS' The philosophy of psychology

CARL F. CRAVER
Review of SHAUN GALLAGHER & JONATHAN SHEAR's Models of the self