VOLUME 16 (2003), ISSUE 1

Manuscripts:

PIM HASELAGER, ANDRÉ de GROOT, & HANS van RAPPARD
Representationalism vs. Anti-Representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance

• Abstract: In recent years the cognitive science community has witnessed the rise of a new, dynamical, approach to cognition. This approach entails a framework in which cognition and behavior are taken to result from complex dynamical interactions between brain, body, and environment. The advent of the dynamical approach is grounded in a dissatisfaction with the classical computational view of cognition. A particularly strong claim has been that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and computations. Focusing on this claim, we take as a starting point a question recently raised by Cliff & Noble (1997): "... if evolution did produce a design that used internal representations, how would we recognize it?" We will argue that cognitive science lacks a proper operationalization of the notion of representation, and therefore is unable to fruitfully discuss whether a particular system has representations or not. A basic method to detect representations in a physical system, grounded in isomorphism, turns out to be quite unconstrained. We will look at a practical example of this problem by examining the debate on whether or not van Gelder's (1995) controversial example of the Watt Governor is representational. We will conclude that cognitive science, as of yet, has no empirically applicable means to answer Cliff & Noble's question unequivocally. This makes the recent representationalism vs. anti-representationalism debate a debate for the sake of appearance.

KIMBERLY A. JAMESON & NANCY ALVARADO
The relational correspondence between category exemplars and names

• Abstract: While recognizing the theoretical importance of context, current research has treated naming as though semantic meaning were invariant and the same mapping of category exemplars and names should exist across experimental contexts. An assumed symmetry or bidirectionality in naming behavior has been implicit in the interchangeable use of tasks that ask subjects to match names to stimuli and tasks that ask subjects to match stimuli to names. Examples from the literature are discussed together with several studies of color naming and basic emotion naming in which no such symmetry was found. A more complete model of naming is proposed to account for flexible mapping of names to items. Principles of naming are suggested to describe effects of stimulus sampling, differing access to terms, task demands, and other impacts on naming behavior.

ADINA ROSKIES
Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "acquired sociopathy" (This paper was the winner of the 2002 William James Prize of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, awarded for the best paper by a graduate student presented at the Society's annual meeting.)

• Abstract: Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori, and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that belief-internalism, the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim, but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide evidence for the falsity of substantive belief-internalism. I describe a group of brain-damaged patients who sustain impairment in their moral sensibility: although they have normal moral beliefs and make moral judgments, they are not inclined to act in accordance with those beliefs and judgments. Thus, I argue that they are walking counterexamples to the substantive internalist claim. In addition to constraining our conception of moral reasoning, this argument stands as an example of how empirical evidence can be relevantly brought to bear on a philosophical question typically viewed to be a priori.

FABRICE CLÉMENT & ABRAHAM J. MALERSTEIN
What is it like to be conscious? The ontogenesis of consciousness

• Abstract: In recent years, numerous studies have tried to highlight, from a naturalistic point of view, the apparent mysteries of consciousness. Many authors concentrated their efforts on explaining the phylogenetic origins of consciousness. Paradoxically, comments on the ontogenesis of consciousness are almost nonexistent. By crossing the results of psychology of development with a philosophical analysis, this paper aims to make up for this omission. After having characterized the different conceptual aspects of consciousness, we combine these, with observations made by developmental psychologists, to trace the empirical development of consciousness during the first months of life. This combination leads to a theoretical proposal: the intentional characteristics of consciousness, namely aboutness and purposefulness, depend on the phenomenal properties of conscious states. From this perspective, the phenomenal aspect of conscious states (the "what it is like" effect) is therefore far from being an epiphenomenon.

GEORGE L. NEWSOME, III
The debate between current versions of covariation and mechanism approaches to causal inference

• Abstract: Current psychological research on causal inference is dominated by two basic approaches: the covariation approach and the mechanism approach. This article reviews these two approaches, evaluates the contributions and limitations of each approach, and suggests how these approaches might be integrated into a more comprehensive framework. Covariation theorists assume that cognizers infer causal relations from conditional probabilities computed over samples of multiple events, but they do not provide an adequate account of how cognizers constrain their search for candidate causes and relevant evidence. Mechanism theorists assume that cognizers use their knowledge of potential mechanisms to infer the causes of individual events, but they do not account for the origins of this kind of knowledge. Theorists might integrate these approaches into a framework that overcomes these limitations by (1) examining important relations between cognizers' beliefs about the nature of causality, the logic of causal inference, and the processes cognizers use to make causal inferences, and (2) providing a more complete account of cognizers' conceptions of causality and the origins of those conceptions.

ILKKA PYYSIÄINEN
True fiction: Philosophy and psychology of religious belief

• Abstract: The phenomenon of religious belief has been much discussed in philosophy of religion. However, a priori argumentation alone cannot establish what religious belief is like as a psychological attitude. Recent advances in the cognitive science of religion have paved the way for a new, naturalized philosophy of religion. Taking into account the relevant results and hypotheses presented within these disciplines, it is possible to develop a more empirically-informed philosophy of religious belief. Instead of asking whether believing is rational, it is here asked how religious belief is cognitively possible. Combining Boyer's evolutionary account of religion with Sperber's and Cosmides & Tooby's theory of metarepresentation, we get the sort of conceptual tool kit needed to specify those cognitive mechanisms and operations that make religious belief possible. Religious belief is shown to require a unique combination of these mechanisms and operations.

ROBERT LOCKIE
Depth psychology and self-deception

• Abstract: This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ('psychodynamic') notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the 'paradoxes' of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception-in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose-or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a 'logic' different to other-deception-the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception-not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches.

Review Essays:

NATIKA NEWTON
A critical review of NICHOLAS MAXWELL's The human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will, and evolution.

• Abstract: Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to support it. Here Maxwell's work is weakest; his arguments for contingent mind-body identity and for free will, on which his larger theory depends, are inadequate. The book is valuable both for its comprehensive view of the human condition and its mysteries, and for its demonstration of the difficulties in making such a view coherent.

BRANDON N. TOWL, JONATHAN HALVORSON, & CARL F. CRAVER
A critical review of CLARK GLYMOUR's The mind's arrows: An elusive target

• Abstract: The mind's arrows, by Clark Glymour, combines several of the author's previous essays on causal inference. Glymour deploys causal Bayes nets (CBNs) to provide a descriptive psychological model of human causal inference and a prescriptive model for making inferences in cognitive neuropsychology and the social sciences. Though The mind's arrows is highly original and provocative, its labyrinthine organization and technical style render it inaccessible to the uninitiated. Here we attempt to distill, package and dress some of Glymour's more interesting theses. We note that the psychological model is developed with minimal attention to evidence concerning human causal inference and that his prescriptive models fail to do justice either to the many sources of evidence in cognitive neuropsychology or to the serious challenges of making causal inferences in the social sciences. Considerable work remains to be done to complete Glymour's ambitious projects and to clearly communicate them to others.

Book Reviews:

GUY ROHRBAUGH
Review of JOSEP CORBÍ & JOSEP PRADES's Minds, causes, and mechanisms

ANTHONY CHEMERO
Review of Rafael Núñez & Walter J. Freeman's Reclaiming cognition: The primacy of action, intention and emotion

TERRY DARTNALL
Review of PETER DODWELL's Brave new mind: A thoughtful inquiry into the nature and meaning of mental life

ANTONINO RAFFONE
Review of L.M. WARD's Dynamical cognitive science

JOHN KULVICKI
Review of MICHAEL THAU's Consciousness and cognition

FRED KEIJZER
Review of RON SUN's Duality of the mind: A bottom up approach toward cognition