VOLUME 16 (2003), ISSUE 2

Manuscripts:

ANNE J. JACOBSON
Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in

• Abstract: This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the extension of "representation" as understood in recent philosophy turns out to be different from what has been thought, the theories that rationalized the old and merely seeming extension are either false or theoretically ill-motivated.

NIRMALANGSHU MUKHERJI
Is CHL linguistically specific?

• Abstract: 'CHL' is Noam Chomsky's shorthand for 'Single Computational System of human language'. CHL is that part of the faculty of language (FL) which integrates lexical information to form linguistic expressions at the interfaces where language interacts with other cognitive systems. In this paper, I am asking whether the elements of FL are dedicated to language alone, or whether significant parts of FL might apply beyond language. From a close examination of the properties of the principles of CHL, I argue that they might well apply to a class of natural symbol systems that includes language and other cognitive systems. This issue of linguistic specificity differs from a similar issue raised recently by Chomsky. For Chomsky, while the 'elements' of the linguistic system per se are drawn from all over nature, general principles of computational efficiency control the operation of the system. Currently, there is little empirical motivation for this vast generalization to all of nature. The more restricted generalization proposed here looks better suited to the current form of inquiry on language and related system.

DAVID PATTEN
How do we deceive ourselves?

• Abstract: Mistakes about one's own psychological states generally, and about one's reasons for acting specifically, can sometimes be considered self-deceptive. In the present paper, I address the question of how someone can come to be deceived about his own motives. I propose that false beliefs about our own reasons for acting are often formed in much the same way that we acquire false beliefs about the motives of others. In particular, I argue that non-motivated biases resulting from the way we understand ourselves lead us to draw mistaken inferences about our own motives. People typically are influenced by various stereotypes in the way they view the actions of others. Similarly, our preconceptions about ourselves influence our interpretations of our own actions. Therefore, self-deception, according to the present thesis, is not necessarily motivated. The self-deceived does not necessarily have the belief about herself that she does because of a desire for that belief to be true, rather her belief is influenced by what she expects to believe.

DANIEL A. LEVY
Neural holism and free will

• Abstract: Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the Connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: Neural Holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive and behavioral shortcomings are easily understood under this model. Assigning moral praise and blame, seen as grounded in the notion that a person has the ability to have done otherwise, will be shown to reflect instead important aspects of signaling in social interactions. Thus, important aspects of the traditional notion of free will can be accounted for within the proposed model, which has interesting implications for lifelong cognitive development.

CONSTANCE E. ROLAND & RICHARD M. FOXX
Self-respect: A neglected concept

• Abstract: Although neglected by psychology, self-respect has been an integral part of philosophical discussion since Aristotle and continues to be a central issue in contemporary moral philosophy. Within this tradition, self-respect is considered to be based on one's capacity for rationality and leads to behaviors that promote autonomy, such as independence, self-control and tenacity. Self-respect elicits behaviors that one should be treated with respect and requires the development and pursuit of personal standards and life plans that are guided by respect for self and others. In contrast, the psychological concept of self-esteem is grounded in the theories of self-concept. As such, self-esteem is a self-evaluation of competency ratios and opinions of significant others that results in either a positive or negative evaluation of one's worthiness and inclusionary status. The major distinction between the two is that while competency ratios and others' opinions are central to self-esteem, autonomy is central to self-respect. We submit that not only is self-respect important in understanding self-esteem, but that it also uniquely contributes to individual functioning. Research is needed to establish the central properties of self-respect and their effects on individual functioning, developmental factors, and therapeutic approaches.

Discussion:

JOSHUA KNOBE
Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation

• Abstract: Four experiments examined people's folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations—considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame—played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people's judgments as to whether or not that behavior should be considered 'intentional'. After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people's concept of intentional action.

ALFRED R. MELE
Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses

• Abstract: This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and intend in various stories, and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended; the influence of considerations of luck, skill, and causal deviance on judgments about what agents do intentionally; what interesting properties all cases of intentional action might share; and the debate between proponents of, respectively, "the Simple View" of the connection between intentional action and intention and "the Single Phenomenon View" of that connection. A substantial body of literature is devoted to the project of analyzing intentional action [1]. In this article, I explore the bearing on that project of some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended. This article may reasonably be regarded as a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a range of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and, likewise, of the potential bearing of attempted philosophical analyses of folk concepts on empirical studies of those concepts.

Book Reviews:

KEN AIZAWA
Review of NAOMI GOLDBLUM's The brain-shaped mind: What the brain can tell us about the mind

DOUGLAS B. MEEHAN
Review of JOÃO BRANQUINHO's The foundations of cognitive science

MICHAEL A. BISHOP
Review of ANDREW BROOK & DON ROSS's Daniel Dennett

ULRICH MÜLLER & JEREMY I.M. CARPENDALE
Review of PETER HOBSON's The cradle of thought: Challenging the origins of thinking

TAD ZAWIDZKI
Review of VINCENT DESCOMBES' (trans. S.A. SCHWARTZ) The mind's provisions: A critique of cognitivism