Volume 18 (2005), Issue 4
Manuscripts:
Martin Montminy
What Use Is Morgan’s Canon?
Abstract: Morgan’s canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of ‘lower’ mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan’s conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’, and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In the process, I identify a number of problems that an adequate formulation of the canon should avoid. I then consider two more recent versions of the canon, proposed by Elliott Sober and Jonathan Bennett. Both are found unsatisfactory, but I argue that a version of Bennett’s unity condition that is restricted to the attribution of recognitional concepts is on the right track.
Itay Shani
Intension and Representation: Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited
Abstract This paper re-addresses Quine’s indeterminacy of translation/inscrutability of reference thesis, as a problem for cognitive theories of content. In contradistinction with Quine’s behavioristic semantics, theories of meaning, or content, in the cognitivist tradition endorse intentional realism, and are prone to be unsympathetic to Quine’s thesis. Yet, despite this fundamental difference, I argue that they are just as vulnerable to the indeterminacy. I then argue that the vulnerability is rooted in a theoretical commitment tacitly shared with Quine, namely, the commitment to the view that the perceptual input to the cognitive system is extensional—differentiating objects, but not the aspects (or, properties) they manifest. Thus, input extensionalism, and not behaviorism, is what forces the indeterminacy. I conclude by suggesting that the solution to Quine’s indeterminacy problem hinges on the elaboration of an intensional theory of perceptual input, and of content in general.
Jan Treur
States of Change: Explaining Dynamics by Anticipatory State Properties
Abstract: In cognitive science, Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) has recently been advocated as an approach to cognitive modelling that is better suited to the dynamics of cognitive processes than the symbolic/computational approaches are. Often, the differences between DST and the symbolic/computational approach are emphasized. However, if two approaches are used, their commonalities can be analyzed and a unifying framework can be sought. In this paper, the possibility of such a unifying perspective on dynamics is analyzed. The analysis covers dynamics in cognitive disciplines, as well as physics, mathematics and computer science. The unifying perspective warrants the development of integrated approaches covering both DST aspects and symbolic/computational aspects. The concept of a state-determined system, which are based on the assumption that properties of a given state fully determine the properties of future states, lies at the heart of DST. Taking this assumption as a premise, the explanatory problem of dynamics is analyzed in more detail. The analysis of four cases within different disciplines (cognitive science, physics, mathematics, computer science) shows how in history this perspective led to numerous often used concepts within them. In cognitive science, the concepts desire and intention were introduced, and in classical mechanics the concepts momentum, energy, and force. Similarly, in mathematics a number of concepts have been developed to formalize the state-determined system assumption (e.g., derivatives (of different orders) of a function, Taylor approximations). Furthermore, transition systems—a currently popular format for specification of dynamic systems within computer science—can also be interpreted from this perspective. One of the main contributions of the paper is that the case studies provide a unified view on the explanation of dynamics across the chosen disciplines. All approaches to dynamics analyzed in this paper share the state-determined system assumption and the (explicit or implicit) use of anticipatory state properties. Within cognitive science, realism is one of the problems identified for the symbolic/computational approach—i.e., how do internal states described by symbols relate to the real world in a natural manner. As DST is proposed as an alternative to the symbolic/computational approach, a natural question is whether, for DST, realism of the states can be better guaranteed. As a second main contribution, the paper provides an evaluation of DST compared to the symbolic/computational approach, which shows that, in this respect (i.e., for the realism problem), DST doesn’t provide a better solution than the other approaches. This shows that DST and the symbolic/computational approach not only have the state-determined system assumption and the use of anticipatory state properties in common, but also the realism problem.
Review Essays:
Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten
Ruthless Reductionism: A Review Essay of John Bickle’sPhilosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account
Abstract: John Bickle’s new book on philosophy and neuroscience is aptly subtitled “a ruthlessly reductive account.” His New Wave Metascience is a massive attack on the relative autonomy that psychology enjoyed until recently, and goes even beyond his previous (Bickle, 1998) New Wave Reductionsism. Reduction of functional psychology to (cognitive) neuroscience is no longer ruthless enough; we should now look rather to cellular or molecular neuroscience at the lowest possible level for explanations of memory, consciousness, and attention. Bickle presents a fascinating set of experimental cases of such molecule-to-mind explanations. This book qualifies as a showcase of naturalism in the philosophy of mind. Naturally, many of the traditional conceptual approaches in the philosophy of mind are given short shrift, but—in Bickle’s Metascientific scheme—the role of philosophy of science also seems reduced to explicating laboratory findings. The present reviewers think that this reductionism suffers from overstretching; in particular, the idea of “explanation in a single bound” from molecule to mind is a bit too ruthless. Still, Bickle’s arguments are worth serious attention.
John Bickle
Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong & Schouten
Tim Bayne
Divided Brains & Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael
Tye’s
Consciousness and Persons
Abstract: In Consciousness and Persons Michael Tye (2003) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye’s account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.
Book Reviews:
William P. Smith
Review of John M. Doris’s Lack of Character:
Personality and Moral Behavior
Matthew Manning
Review of M. J. Cain’s Fodor: Language, Mind
and Philosophy
Charles Starkey
Review of Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions