Volume 20 (2007), Issue 3
Regular Articles:
Albert Newen & Andreas Bartels
Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts
In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations.
Cara Spencer
Unconscious Vision and the Platitudes of Folk Psychology
Since we explain behavior by ascribing intentional states to the agent, many philosophers have assumed that some guiding principle of folk psychology like the following, which I call intentional states and actions (ISA), must be true: ‘‘If A and B are different actions, then the agents performing them must differ in their intentional states at the time they are performed.’’ Recent results in the physiology of vision present a prima facie problem for this principle. These results show that some visual information that guides spatial manipulation and fine motor control is unavailable for verbal report. Plausibly, this information is not consciously available to the agent, and as such, not available to inform the content of intentional states. Thus, it is hard to see how every difference in action is subject to intentional explanation, as (ISA) requires. I articulate the prima facie problem and argue that the most plausible solution requires us to reject (ISA).
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen
The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon
Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers’ attempt to use evolutionary psychology to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture.
Gottfried Vosgerau
Conceptuality in Spatial Representations
The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations’ structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, which allows for new explanations of certain features of spatial representations and how they are linked to other capacities, like perception and reasoning.
Don Gustafson
Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories
Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional alternative to causal analyses of intentional action is not threatened by the putative scientific findings. This, in turn, is ironic in that defenders of the noncausal accounts of action were thought to be in opposition to the natural sciences of action whereas the analyses in the causal style were “on the side of physicalism.” This result is also assessed in what follows.
Simon Boag
“Real Processes,” and the Explanatory Status of Repression and Inhibition
The recent interest in neuroscientific psychodynamic research (“Neuro-psychoanalysis”) has meant that empirical findings are emerging which allow greater public scrutiny of psychodynamic concepts. However, Macmillan has claimed that the psychoanalytic cornerstone, repression, is a circular explanatory term and incapable of referring to a “real process.” This paper discusses Macmillan’s criticism and finds that repression is a coherent explanatory term and is not precluded from referring to real processes. Specifically, “neural inhibition,” triggered by social factors, can account for Freudian repression, without succumbing to circular explanation. Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that a plausible mechanism of inhibition exists, providing testable avenues for the “cornerstone” of psychoanalysis. Evidence of the role of the frontal lobes, a brain area that appears to mediate the influence of social factors upon impulse control, demonstrates that repression is plausible within a dynamic neural framework.
Book Reviews:
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Review of Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, and
Robert Solomon, In Defense of Sentimentality
Richard Brown
Review of Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness
Derek H. Brown
Review of Nicholas Georgalis, The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language
Penny Munn
Review of Jeremy Carpendale & Ulrich Müller (Eds.), Social Interaction and the Development of Knowledge