VOLUME 4 (1991), ISSUE 2
- Discussion: Connectionism and Folk Psychology
- GERARD J. O'BRIEN
Is connectionism commonsense?
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Abstract:
In this paper I critically examine the line of reasoning that has recently appeared in the literature that connects connectionism with eliminativism. This line of reasoning has it that if connectionist models turn out to accurately characterize our cognition, then beliefs, desires and the other intentional entities of common sense psychology will be eliminated from our theoretical ontology. In complete contrast I argue (1) that not only is this line of reasoning mistaken about the eliminativist tendencies of connectionist models, but (2) that these models have the potential to provide a more robust vindication of common sense psychology than classical computational models.
STEPHEN STICH
Causal holism and commonsense psychology: A reply to O'Brien
Manuscripts:
THOMAS NATSOULAS
"Why do things look as they do?" Some Gibsonian answers to Koffka's question
DAVID G. STERN
Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science
ANDREW APTER
The problem of who: Multiple personality, personal identity, and the
double brain
NIKOLA GRAHEK
Objective and subjective aspects of pain
GIOVANNI B. MONETA
Ambiguity, inductive systems, and the modeling of subjective probability judgments
Book Reviews:
DON GUSTAFSON
Review of DAN LLOYD's Simple minds
EDWARD K. MORRIS
Review of K.W. BUCKLEY's Mechanical man: John Broadus Watson and the beginnings of behaviorism
HAROLD D. FISHBEIN
Review of ANDY CLARK's Microcognition: Philosophy, cognitive science, and parallel distributed processing