VOLUME 6 (1993), ISSUE 1
- Manuscripts:
- PAT MANFREDI
Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends
GIOVANNI MONETA
A model of scientist's creative potential: The matching of cognitive structure and domain structure
FRED VOLLMER
A theory of traits
Discussion: Fodor's Modal Argument
FRED ADAMS
Fodor's modal argument
LILLY-MARLENE RUSSOW
Fodor, Adams, and causal properties
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Abstract:
Should psychology individuate states by means of their narrow content alone? That is currently a popular question, and in "Fodor's modal arguement," Frederick Adams argues for a negative answer. For the purposes of doing psychology, should we treat two mental states with identical narrow content but different broad content as being of the same natural kind, as opposed to belonging to two different natural kinds, with different causal powers? Whether or not this question is clearer than the first, it is the one Fodor (1991) addresses in the article which Adams criticizes in order to defend a broad-content psychology
FRED ADAMS
Reply to Russow
Review Essay:
ROBERT McCAULEY
Brainwork: A review of PAUL CHURCHLAND's A neurocomputational perspective
Book Reviews:
MIRIAM SOLOMAN
Review of JOHN R. ANDERSON's The adaptive character of thought
DIANNE STOBER
Review of TONI BERNAY & DOROTHY W. CANTON's The psychology of today's woman: New psychoanalytic visions
ROBERT J. MATHEWS
Reviews of STEPHEN PINKER's Learnability and cognition: The acquisition of argument structure
RUSSELL TRENHOLME
Review of MARK RICHARD's Propositional attitudes, an essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them
MAX VELMANS
Review of ALAN CHALMER's Science and its fabrication