VOLUME 8 (1995), ISSUE 1

Manuscripts:

MARK ROWLANDS
Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach

• Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J.J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. First, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Second, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how thee principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology.

PEGGY DesAUTELS
Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's "perceptual plasticity"

• Abstract: In this paper I argue that because P.M. Churchland does not adequately address the distinction between high-level cognitive theories and low-level embodied theories, Churchland's claims for theory-lade perception lose their epistemological significance. I propose that Churchland and others debating the theory-ladenness of perception should distinguish carefully between two main ways in which perception is plastic: through modifying our high-level theories directly and through modifying our low-level theories using training experiences. This will require them to attend to two very different types of constraints on the modification of our perceptions.

ANTTI REVONSUO
Consciousness, dreams, and virtual realities

• Abstract: In this paper I develop the thesis that dreams are essential to an understanding of waking consciousness. In the first part I argue in opposition to the philosophers Malcolm and Dennett that empirical evidence now shows dreams to be real conscious experiences. In the second part, three questions concerning consciousness research are addressed. (1) How do we isolate the system to be explained (consciousness) from other systems? (2) How do we describe the system thus isolated? (3) How do we reveal the mechanisms on which this system is based? I suggest that empirical dream research combined with other empirical approaches can help us to sketch answers to all of these questions. I argue that the subjective form of dreams reveals the subjective, macro-level form of consciousness in general and that both dreams and the everyday phenomenal world may be thought of as constructed "virtual realities." A major task for empirical consciousness research is to find out the mechanisms which bind this experienced world into a coherent whole.

LOUIS C. CHARLAND
Emotion as a natural kind: Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory

• Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are representation-governed phenomena and that the explanation of how they figure in behavior must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defense of the hypothesis that emotions may be more fundamental in the organization of behavior than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers. The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework.

ALLIN COTTRELL
Tertium datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's Consciousness reconsidered

• Abstract: Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's "disqualification" of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, blindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the "middle ground."

Book Reviews:

JAMES A. McGILVRAY
Review of AUSTEN CLARK's Sensory qualities

CURTIS BROWN
Review of MARK JOHNSON's Moral imagination: Implications of cognitive science for ethics

MARK H. BICKHARD
Review of FRANCISCO J. VARELA & JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY's Understanding origins