VOLUME 8 (1995), ISSUE 2

Review Essay:

DON GUSTAFSON
Eighteen months on the planet and already a psychological theorist: A critical review essay of HENRY M. WELLMAN's The child's theory of mind

• Abstract: After I give an account of Wellman's research and findings (Section II), I turn to the large issues at stake here. I concentrate on the following: (1) the theory approach to young children's performance and comprehension with respect to other's psychology (Section III); (2) the theory change account of development in this kind of performance and comprehension from about eighteen months to late pre-school age (Section III); (3) the lack of clarity in Wellman's discussion of his view and the relation of his view to views of others, including those of Harris and Kavanaugh in their monography (Section IV); and (4) a lingering problem with Wellman's notion of theoreticity (Section V).

Manuscripts:

CAROL SHERRARD
Social identity and aesthetic taste

• Abstract: Bourdieu's theory of aesthetic taste shares with social identity theory the concepts of reciprocal comparison and differentiation among social groups. This study used discourse analysis of interviews with further-education students on the topic of aesthetic taste to test the hypothesis, derived from these theories, that individuals always present their tastes in line with social differentiations. Since these students were moving from working-class to middle-class identities via education, it was expected that their discourse would be rich in the inconsistencies which need discourse analysis. Most respondents denied links between social class and aesthetic taste, but produced inconsistent "individualist" and "socialization" repertoires. The individualist repertoire gave priority to individual choice in looking forward to a middle-class identity, while the socialization repertoire favored egalitarianism in looking backward to working-class origins and tastes. This inconsistency was resolved in one of two ways, "reconstrue society", or "reconstrue self". The "reconstrue society" resolution had three versions: progressivism (assertion of rapid disappearance of classes); reduction of class to resistible peer pressure; and subdivision of the working class into non-cultured and cultured segments, identifying the self with the latter. "Reconstrue self" presented the self as overriding socialization forces, but split identity between a social outer appearance and a private inner self.

GILBERTO GOMES
Self-awareness and the mind-brain problem

• Abstract: The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself. Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true nature. Psychoneural identity can thus be considered a valid hypothesis. Related views of Kant, Freud, Shaffer, Bunge and others are considered. "Naïve psychical realism" is criticized. Consciousness of mental events is considered as the result of the action of a cerebral system that observes the neural events hypothetically identical to mental events. The theory combines a materialist view with a due consideration of subjective experience.

WILLIAM S. ROBINSON
Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology

• Abstract: Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns "discernible in agents' (observable) behavior" (p.30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor for the supporting assumption about the commitments of folk psychology. Several generally implicit arguments in support of the latter assumption are considered. Explicit arguments for it by Ramsey et al. (1990) and Wellman (1990) are examined and judged unsuccessful. An explicit argument for strong realism by Cummins (in conversation) is also found inadequate. Consideration of this latter argument helps to explain why we cannot be satisfied with Dennett's own very brief discussion of causation by beliefs.

Book Reviews:

NICHOLAS GEORGALIS
Review of JOHN HEIL's The nature of true minds

ASHWIM RAM & ERIC JONES
Review of DAVID KIRSH's Foundations of artificial intelligence

J. ANGELO CORLETT
Review of WILLIAM R. SHADISH & STEVE FULLER's The social psychology of science

CAROL SLATER
Review of BARBARA von ECKARDT's What is cognitive science?

C.U.M. SMITH
Review of GRAHAM RICHARDS' Mental machinary: The origins and consequences of psychological ideas, 1600-1850

DORIT BAR-ON
Review of BARRY LOEWER & GEORGES REY's Meaning in mind: Fodor and his critics