VOLUME 9 (1996), ISSUE 1

Editorial:

WILLIAM BECHTEL, editor
Looking back, looking forward

Discussion: Virtue Ethics

VINCENT A. PUNZO
After Kohlberg: Virtue ethics and the recovery of the moral self

• Abstract: A resurgence of interest in virtue ethics has engendered new insight into the fundamental link between selfhood and morality. In contradistinction to the currently ascendant justice-reasoning research paradigm, it appears that a virtue ethics approach to moral psychology provides a theoretical framework which is amenable to the empirical investigation of the nature and formation of the moral self. Six primary features of virtue ethics are delineated with a unifying emphasis throughout on the inextricable link between virtue and moral selfhood. Questions and issues concerning the possibility of a psychology of virtue ethics are directly addressed throughout.

LAURENCE THOMAS
Virtue ethics and the arc of universality: Reflections on Punzo's reading of Kantian and virtue ethics

• Abstract: While I agree with Punzo's central thesis that virtue ethics is superior to Kantian ethics, the aims of my comments are twofold. On the one hand, I draw attention to some ways in which Punzo overstates the case against Kantian ethics, noting that unattainable ideals as such are no mark against a moral theory. On the other, I build upon Punzo's insights in order to bring into sharper focus the superiority of virtue ethics. Accordingly, I distinguish between inter-species (Kantian ethics) and intra-species (virtue ethics) morality, maintaining that the former, unlike the latter, invariably proves too wide of the mark.

Manuscripts:

KENNETH R. LIVINGSTON
The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology

• Abstract: The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally-based norms are then re-examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework.

DAN LLOYD
Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A meeting of the minds

• Abstract: Accounting for phenomenal structure—the forms, aspects, and features of conscious experience—poses a deep challenge for the scientific study of consciousness, but rather than abandon hope I propose a way forward. Connectionism, I argue, offers a bi-directional analogy, with its oft-noted "neural inspiration" on the one hand, and its largely unnoticed capacity to illuminate our phenomenology on the other. Specifically, distributed representations in a recurrent network enable networks to superpose categorical, contextual, and temporal information on a specific input representation, much as our own experience does. Artificial neural networks also suggest analogues of four salient distinctions between sensory and nonsensory consciousness. The paper concludes with speculative proposals for discharging the connectionist heuristics to leave a robust, detailed empirical theory of consciousness.

ROBERT SCHWARTZ
Directed perception

• Abstract: Recently it has been argued that a model of directed perception provides an alternative to both indirect and direct accounts of the nature of vision. An examination of this proposal serves as a basis for challenging the meaningfulness and empirical import of the theoretical and ontological differences said to separate these models. Although focusing on James Cutting's work, the analysis is meant to speak more generally to the supposed significance of the distinctions among indirect, direct, and directed theories of perception.

STUART SILVERS
Rational reconstruction and immature science

• Abstract: The distinction between mature and immature science is controversial. Laudan (1977) disavows the idea of immature science while von Eckardt (1993) claims that cognitive science is just that (an immature science) and modifies Laudan's Research Tradition methodology to argue its rational pursuability. She uses the (Kuhnian) idea of a framework of shared characteristics (FSC) to identify the community of cognitive scientists. Diverse community assumptions pertaining specifically to human cognitive capacities (should) consolidate cognitive research efforts into a coherent and rationally pursuable scientific endeavor. Von Eckardt maintains that the substantive assumptions about the computational and representational character of human cognitive capacities are central to the rational reconstruction of immature cognitive science in two ways. Descriptively, these assumptions are evident in the cognitive science community. Normatively, the assumptions satisfy justificatory conditions on the rational pursuit of this computational, cognitive science research tradition. Normativity is a problem for any naturalistic approach and thus for von Eckardt's FSC. I critique the FSC strategy and present a modestly naturalistic alternative based on ideas of Goodman, Quine, and more recently, Philip Kitcher. I apply them to the "childhood afflictions" endemic to immaturity, scientific and otherwise. I test my critique of immature computational cognitive science by discussing two phenomena that, in my view, belong properly to any theory of human cognition but are noticeably absent from von Eckardt's FSC reconstruction. I conclude that understanding the reasons why the FSC view fails can and should contribute to the development of a successful and complete theory of human cognition.

Book Reviews:

VALERIE G. HARDCASTLE
Review of JAMES F. IACCINO's Left brain-right brain: Inquiries, evidence, and new approaches

RICHARD WYATT
Review of JACK COPELAND's Artificial intelligence: A philosophical introduction

WILLIAM S. ROBINSON
Review of ROGER PENROSE's Shadows of the mind

MATTHEW ELTON
Review of D. KIRK's Raw feeling: A philosophical account of the essence of consciousness

AUSTEN CLARK
Review of ROBERT SCHWARTZ's Vision: Variations on some Berkeleian themes

BERENT ENĒ
Review of JEFFREY POLAND's Physicalism

JAMES L. PATE
Review of KURT DANZIGER's Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research

JOSEFA TORIBIO
Review of MAX J. CRESSWELL's Language in the world: A philosophical enquiry