VOLUME 9 (1996), ISSUE 3

Manuscripts:

JAMES W. GARSON
Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind

• Abstract: This paper explores a line of argument against the classical paradigm in cognitive science that is based upon properties of non-linear dynamical systems, especially in their chaotic and near-chaotic behavior. Systems of this kind are capable of generating information-rich macro behavior that could be useful to cognition. I argue that a brain operating at the edge of chaos could generate high-complexity cognition in this way. If this hypothesis is correct, then the symbolic processing methodology in cognitive science faces serious obstacles. A symbolic description of the mind will be extremely difficult, and even if it is achieved to some approximation, there will still be reasons for rejecting the hypothesis that the brain is in fact a symbolic processor.

FRED A. KEIJZER & SACHA BEM
Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism

• Abstract: Cognitive science's basic premises are under attack. In particular, its focus on internal cognitive processes is a target. Intelligence is increasingly interpreted, not as a matter of reclusive thought, but as successful agent-environment interaction. The critics claim that a major reorientation of the field is necessary. However, this will only occur when there is a distinct alternative conceptual framework to replace the old one. Whether or not a serious alternative is provided is not clear. Among the critics there is some consensus, however, that this role could be fulfilled by the concept of a 'behavioral system'. This integrates agent and environment into one encompassing general system. We will discuss two contexts in which the behavioral systems idea is being developed. Autonomous Agents Research is the enterprise of building behavior-based robots. Dynamical Systems Theory provides a mathematical framework well suited for describing the interactions between complex systems. We will conclude that both enterprises provide important contributions to the behavioral systems idea. But neither turns it into a full conceptual alternative which will initiate a major paradigm switch in cognitive science. The concept will need a lot of fleshing out before it can assume that role.

HANNE ANDERSON, PETER BARKER, & XIANG CHEN
Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychology

• Abstract: Drawing on the results of modern psychology and cognitive science we suggest that the traditional theory of concepts is no longer tenable, and that the alternative account proposed by Kuhn may now be seen to have independent empirical support quite apart from its success as part of an account of scientific change. We suggest that these mechanisms can also be understood as special cases of general cognitive structures revealed by cognitive science. Against this background, incommensurability is not an insurmountable obstacle to accepting Kuhn's position, as many philosophers of science still believe. Rather it becomes a natural consequence of cognitive structures that appear in all human beings.

PETER WEATHERALL
What do propositions measure in folk psychology?

• Abstract: In this paper, I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterization of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterization of propositional attitudes in order to provide a naturalistic account of their use. I argue that a closer examination of the analogy implies rather than avoids the existence of structured representations constituting a language of thought, and thus that it should be abandoned by those who wish to avoid the postulation of such internal representations.

Review Essay:

T.C. MEYERING
Philosophical psychology in historical perspective: Review essay of J.C. Smith's Historical foundations of cognitive science

• Abstract: Historiography of science faces a preliminary question of strategy. A continuist conception of the history of science poses research problems different from those of a dynamic conception, which acknowledges that not only our theoretical knowledge but also the explananda themselves may change under the influence of new scientific insights. Whereas continuist historiography many advance our understanding of (the historical background of) current theoretical problems, dynamic historiography may also make a creative contribution to the progress of present-day research. This fact is illustrated in a discussion of the various treatments of paradigmatic episodes in the history of philosophical psychology collected in the book under review, ranging from Socratic and Platonic sources of cognitivism, through medieval and modern views on mental language, representation and consciousness, to such 20th-century contributions as those of Husserl, Titchener, and analytic philosophy.

Book Reviews:

W.F.G. HASELAGER
Review of PAUL CHURCHLAND's The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: A philosophical journey into the brain

ANDY CLARK
Review of EDWARD HUTCHINS' Cognition in the wild

JAY L. GARFIELD
Review of MARGARET A. BODEN's Dimensions of creativity

CAROL W. SLATER
Review of WILLIAM J. CLANCEY, STEPHEN SMOLIAR, & MARK STEFIK's Contemplating minds: A forum for artificial intelligence

LOUIS CHARLAND
Review of RICHARD & BERNICE LAZARUS' Passion and reason: Making sense of our emotions

CHARLES SIEWERT
Review of GALEN STRAWSON's Mental reality

MARK L. JOHNSON
Review of JOSE LUIS BERMUDEZ, ANTHONY MARCEL, & NAOMI EILAN's The body and the self