William Bechtel's Publications

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BOOKS:

  • Bechtel, W. and Huang, L. (2022). Philosophy of neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge Element.
  • Bechtel, W. (1988). Philosophy of mind: An overview for cognitive science. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Italian translation: Philosofia della mente. (Marco Salucci, trans.) Bologna: Societa editrice il Mulino, 1992. 

EDITED BOOKS:

RECENT JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS:

Bollhagen, A., & Bechtel, W. (2022). Discovering autoinhibition as a design principle for the control of biological mechanisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 95, 145-157

Bich, L., & Bechtel, W. (2022). Control mechanisms: Explaining the integration and versatility of biological organisms. Adaptive Behavior, 30(5), 389-407.

Bechtel, W. (2022). Discovering control mechanisms: The controllers of dynein. Philosophy of Science 89(5), 1145-1154.

Bechtel, W. (2022). Reductionistic Explanations of Cognitive Information Processing: Bottoming Out in Neurochemistry. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 16.

Bechtel, W. and Vagnino, R. (2022). Figuring out what is happening: The discovery of two electrophysiological phenomena. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 44(2), 20

Bich, L. and Bechtel, W. (2022). Organization needs organization. Understanding integrated control in living organisms. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 93, 96-106.

Bechtel, W. (2022). Levels in biological organisms: Hierarchy of production mechanisms, heterarchy of control mechanisms. Monist, 105(2), 156-17.

Bechtel, W. and Bollhagen, A. (2021). Active biological mechanisms: transforming energy into motion in molecular motors. Synthese.

Bich, L. and Bechtel, W. (2021) Mechanism, autonomy and biological explanation. Biology and Philosophy, 36

Huang, L., Bich, L., and Bechtel, W. (2021). Model organisms for studying decision-making: A phylogenetically expanded perspective. Philosophy of Science

Bechtel, W. and Bich, L. (2021). Grounding cognition: Heterarchical control mechanisms in biology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 376(1820).

Bechtel, W. (2020). Hierarchy and levels: Analyzing networks to study mechanisms in molecular biology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. : Biological Sciences, 375(1796), 20190320

Huang, L. and Bechtel, W. (2020). A Phylogenetic Perspective on Distributed Decision-Making Mechanisms. Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Bechtel, W. and Huang, L. (2020). Decentering Cognition. Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Bechtel, W. (2020). Schaffner on levels and selves. In K. Kendler, J. Parnas and P. Zachar (Eds.), Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology (pp. 410-417) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, W. (2020). Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical networks of control mechanisms (pp. 24-46). In In K. Kendler, J. Parnas and P. Zachar (Eds.), Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, W. (2020). Data journeys beyond databases in systems biology: Cytoscape and NDEx. In S. Leonelli and N. Tempini (Eds.), Varieties of data journeys (pp. 121-143). Dordrecht: Springer.

Sheredos, B. and Bechtel, W. (2020). Imagining mechanisms with diagrams. In Levy, A. and Godfrey-Smith, P. (Eds.). The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Levy, A. and Bechtel, W. (2020). Beyond machine-like mechanisms. In Holm, S. and Serban, M. (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Engineering Approach in Biology: Living Machines? New York: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2020). Living machines: The extent and limits of the machine metaphor. In Holm, S. and Serban, M. (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on the Engineering Approach in Biology: Living Machines? New York: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2019). Resituating cognitive mechanisms within heterarchical networks controlling physiology and behavior. Theory and Psychology, 29, 620-639.

Bechtel, W. (2019). From parts to mechanisms: research heuristics for addressing heterogeneity in cancer genetics. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 41:27.

Bechtel, W. and Bollhagen, A. (2019). The philosophy of cell biology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Bechtel, W. (2019). Networks and dynamics: 21st century neuroscience. In John Symons, Sarah Robins, Paco Calvo (Eds.). Routledge companion to philosophy of psychology, Second Edition. London: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2019). Analyzing network models to make discoveries about biological mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70, 459-484.

Winning, J. and Bechtel, W. (2019) Being emergence vs. pattern emergence: Complexity, control, and goal-directedness in biological systems. In S. Gibb, R. F. Hendry, and T. Lancaster (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Emergence (134-144). London: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2018). The importance of constraints and control in biological mechanisms: Insights from cancer research. Philosophy of Science, 85, 573-593.

Bechtel, W. (2018). Explaining features of fine-grained phenomena using abstract analyses of phenomena and mechanisms: Two examples from chronobiology. Synthese.

Bechtel, W., Abrahamsen, A. and Sheredos, B. (2018). Using diagrams to reason about biological mechanisms. P. Chapman, G. Stapleton, A. Moktefi, S. Perez-Kriz, and F. Bellucci (Eds.). Diagrammatic representation and inference. Springer.

Winning, J. and Bechtel, W. (2018). Rethinking causality in biological and neural mechanisms: Constraints and control. Minds and Machines, 28, 287-310.

Green, S. Serban, M. Scholl, Jones, N. Brigandt, I. and Bechtel, W. (2018). Network analyses in systems biology: New strategies for dealing with biological complexity. Synthese. 195:1751–1777.

Abrahamsen, A., Sheredos, B., and Bechtel, W. (2018). Explaining visually: Mechanism diagrams. In Glennan, S. and Illari, P. The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2017). Using the hierarchy of biological ontologies to identify mechanisms in flat networks. Biology & Philosophy, 32, 627-649.

Sheredos, B. and Bechtel, W. (2017). Sketching biological phenomena and mechanisms. Topics in Cognitive Science, 9, 970-985

Shagrir, O. and Bechtel, W. (2017). Marr’s computational level and delineating phenomena. In Kaplan, D. M. (editor),  Explanation and integration in mind and brain science  (pp. 190-2014). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bechtel, W. 2017). Enriching the strategies for creating mechanistic explanations in biology. In In Matlin, K., Maienschein, J., and Laubichler, M. Visions of Cell Biology: Reflections on Cowdry’s General Cytology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bechtel, W. (2017). Top-down causation in biology and neuroscience: Control hierarchies. Orilia, F. & Paoletti, M. P. (eds.) In Philosophical and scientific perspectives on downward causation. London: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2017). Mechanists must be holists too: Perspectives from circadian biology. Journal of the History of Biology.

Bechtel, W. (2017). Explicating Top-Down Causation Using Networks and Dynamics. Philosophy of Science, 84, 253-274

Bechtel, W. 2017). Systems biology: Negotiating between holism and reductionism. In S. Green (Ed.). Philosophy of systems biology: Perspectives from scientists and philosophers. Springer

Bechtel, W. (2017). Diagrammatic reasoning. In L. Magnani and T. Bertolotti, eds., Springer Handbook of Model-based Science. Dordrecht: Springer.

Bechtel, W. (2016). Using Computational Models to Discover and Understand Mechanisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 56, 113-121.

Winning, J. and Bechtel, W. 2016). Information theoretic philosophy of mind. In L. Floridi (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Information. London: Routledge.

Martin, E. and Bechtel, W. (2016). Multiple orders in biology. In N. Cartwright and K. Ward (Eds.), Rethinking order: After the laws of nature. London: Bloomsbury.

Bechtel, W. (2016). Investigating neural representations: The tale of place cells. Synthese, 193, 1287-1321.

Bechtel, W. (2015). Circadian rhythms and mood disorders: Are the phenomena and mechanisms causally related? Frontiers in Psychology.

Burnston, D. C., Sheredos, B., Abrahamsen, A. and Bechtel, W. (2015). Scientists’ use of diagrams in developing mechanistic explanations: A case study from chronobiology. Pragmatics and Cognition.

Bechtel, W. (2015). Can mechanistic explanation be reconciled with scale-free constitution and dynamics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science.

Bechtel, W. and Shagrir, O. (2015). The Non-Redundant Contributions of Marr’s Three Levels of Analysis for Explaining Information Processing Mechanisms. Topics in Cognitive Science.

Abrahamsen, A. and Bechtel, W. 2015). Diagrams as tools for scientific reasoning. Review of Psychology and Philosophy, 6, 117-131.

Bechtel, W. (2015). Generalizing mechanistic explanations using graph-theoretic representations. In Pierre-Alain Braillard and Christophe Malaterre eds. Explanation in Biology. An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Dordrecht, Springer.

Green, S., Levy, A., and Bechtel, W. (2015). Design sans adaptation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5, 15-29.

Herschbach, M. and Bechtel, W. (2015). Mental mechanisms and psychological construction. In L. Barrett and J. Russell, The psychological construction of emotion. Guilford Press.

Bechtel, W., Sheredos, B., Burnston, D., and Abrahamsen, A. (2014). Representing time in scientific diagrams. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Bechtel, W. (2014). Cognitive biology: Surprising model organisms for cognitive science Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Borensztajn, G., Zuidema, J. and Bechtel, W. (2014). Systematicity and the need for encapsulated representations. In Calvo, P. and Symons, J., (eds.) The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 165-190.

Sheredos, B., Burston, D. C., Abrahamsen, A, and Bechtel, W. (2013). Why do biologists use so many diagrams? Philosophy of Science, 80, 931-944.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2013). Roles of diagrams in computational modeling of mechanisms. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, pp. 1839-1844.

Bechtel, W. (2013). Network organization in health and disease: On being a reductionist and a systems biologist too. Pharmacopsychiatry, 46 Suppl 1, S10-21.

Bechtel, W. (2013). From molecules to behavior and the clinic: Integration in chronobiology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.

Bechtel, W. (2013). From molecules to networks: Adoption of systems approaches in circadian rhythm research. In Andersen, H., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W. J., Uebel, T., and and Wheeler, G., New challenges to philosophy of science. Springer, pp. 211-223. Dordrecht: Springer.

Bechtel, W. (2013). The endogenously active brain: The need for an alternative cognitive architecture. Philosophia Scientia, 17, 3-30.

Bechtel, W. 2013). Understanding biological mechanisms: Using illustrations from circadian rhythm research. In Kampourakis, K. (Ed.) The Philosophy of Biology: A Companion for Educators, pp. 487-510. Dordrecht: Springer.

Bechtel, W. (2013). Addressing the Vitalist's Challenge to Mechanistic Science: Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation. In S. Normandin & C. T. Wolfe (Eds.), Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment Life Science, 1800-2010, pp. 345-370. Dordrecht: Springer.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2013). Thinking dynamically about biological mechanisms: Networks of coupled oscillators. Foundations of Science, 18, 707-723.

Levy, A. and Bechtel, W. (2012). Abstraction and the organization of mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 80, 241-261.

Three entries for the Werner Dubitzky, Olaf Wolkenhauer, Kwang-Hyun Cho, Hiroki Yokota (Eds.), Encyclopedia of systems biology, New York: Springer:

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A., Mechanism, Dynamic
Craver, C. and Bechtel, W., Interlevel causation
Halina, M. and Bechtel, W., Mechanism, Conserved

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2012). Diagramming phenomena for mechanistic explanation. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Bechtel, W. (2012). Understanding endogenously active mechanisms: A scientific and philosophical challenge. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2, 233-248

Bechtel, W. (2012). Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: Perspectives from circadian rhythm research. In S. Gozzano and C. Hill (Eds.), The mental, The physical: New perspectives on type identity. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, W. (2012). Referring to localized cognitive operations in parts of dynamically active brains. In A. Raftopoulos and P. Machamer (Eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abrahamsen, A. and Bechtel, W. (2012). History and core themes. In K. Frankish and W. Ramsey, T he Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.

Herschbach, M. and Bechtel, W. (2011). Relating Bayes to cognitive mechanisms. (Commentary on Jones and Love, "Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition.") Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

Kaplan, D. M. and Bechtel, W. (2011). Dynamical Models: An Alternative or Complement to Mechanistic Explanations. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3, 438-444..

Bechtel, W. (2011). Mechanism and biological explanation. Philosophy of Science, 78, 533-557.

Abrahamsen, A. and Bechtel, W. (2011). From reactive to endogenously active dynamical conceptions of the brain. In Reydon, T. and Plaisance, K. Philosophy of Behavioral Biology. Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer.

Burnston, D., Sheredos, B. and Bechtel, W. (2011). HIT on the psychometric approach. Psychological Inquiry, 22, 108-114.

Bechtel, W. (2011). Representing time of day in circadian clocks. In Albert Newen, Andreas Bartels & Eva-Maria Jung (eds.) Knowledge and Representation. Palo Alto: CSLI Publications and Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2011). Complex biological mechanisms: Cyclic, oscillatory, and autonomous. In C. A. Hooker (Ed.), Philosophy of complex systems. Handbook of the philosophy of science, Volume 10. New York: Elsevier.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2010). Understanding the brain as an endogenously active mechanism. In Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Bechtel, W. (2010). The cell: Locus or object of inquiry? Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, , 41, 172-182.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen (2010). Dynamic mechanistic explanation: Computational modeling of circadian rhythms as an exemplar for cognitive science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.,1, 321-333.

Bechtel, W. (2010). How can philosophy be a true cognitive science disciplines? Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 357-366.

Bechtel, W. (2010). The downs and ups of mechanistic research: Circadian rhythm research as an exemplar. Erkenntnis, , 73, 313-328.

Bechtel, W. and Richardson, R. C. (2010). Neuroimaging as a tool for functionally decomposing cognitive processes. In S. J. Hanson and M. Bunzl, Foundational issues in human brain mapping (pp. 241-262). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bechtel, W. and Herschbach, M. (2010). Philosophy of the cognitive sciences. In Fritz Allhoff (Ed.) Philosophy of the sciences (pp. 237-261) . Oxford: Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2009). Decomposing, Recomposing, and Situating Circadian Mechanisms: Three Tasks in Developing Mechanistic Explanations. In Leitgeb, H. and Hieke, A. (Eds.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Neuroscience (pp. 173-186). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Looking down, around, and up: Mechanistic explanation in psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 22, 543-564.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Generalization and discovery by assuming conserved mechanisms: Cross species research on circadian oscillators. Philosophy of Science, 76, 762-773.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Constructing a philosophy of science of cognitive science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 548-569.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Some virtues of modeling with both hands. Adaptive Behavior, 17, 293-295.

Bechtel, W. and Wright, C. (2009). What is psychological explanation? In P. Calvo and J. Symons (ed.) Routledge companion to philosophy of psychology (pp. 113-130). London: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Molecules, systems, and behavior: Another view of memory consolidation. In Bickle, J. (Editor),
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, (pp. 13-40). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bechtel, W. (2009). Explanation: Mechanism, modularity, and situated cognition. In P. Robbins and M. Aydede (Eds.). Cambridge handbook of situated cognition (pp. 155-170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, W. (2008). Mechanisms in cognitive psychology: What are the operations? Philosophy of Science, 75, 995-1007

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2008). From reduction back to higher levels. Proceedings of the 30 th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 559-564). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2007). Explaining human freedom and dignity mechanistically: From receptive to active mechanisms. The Journal of Philosophical Research, 32, 43-66

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2007). Mental mechanisms, autonomous systems, and moral agency. Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society (pp. 95-100). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.

Craver, C. F. and Bechtel, W. (2007). Top-down causation without top-down causes. Biology and Philosophy, 22, 547-563.

Bechtel, W. (2007). Reducing psychology while maintaining its autonomy via mechanistic explanation. In M. Schouten and H. Looren de Jong (Eds.). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. (2007). Biological mechanisms: Organized to maintain autonomy. In F. Boogerd, et al., Systems Biology; Philosophical Foundations. New York: Elsevier.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A (2007). In search of mitochondrial mechanisms: Interfield excursions between cell biology and biochemistry. Journal of the History of Biology, 40, 1-33.

Wright, C. and Bechtel, W. (2007). Mechanisms and psychological explanation. In P. Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (Volume 4 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). New York: Elsevier.

Bechtel, W. and Hamilton, A. (2007). Reductionism, integration, and the unity of the sciences. T. Kuipers (ed.), Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (Volume 1 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science). New York: Elsevier.

Abrahamsen, A., & Bechtel, W. (2006). Phenomena and mechanisms: Putting the symbolic, connectionist, and dynamical systems debate in broader perspective. In R. Stainton (Ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, William (in press). The epistemology of evidence in cognitive neuroscience. In R. Skipper Jr., C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson, and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Craver, C. F. and Bechtel, W. (2006), Mechanism. In S. Sarkar & J. Pfeifer (eds.), Philosophy of science: an encyclopedia (pp. 469-478) . New York: Routledge.

Bechtel, W. (2005). The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 84, 313-325 .

Bechtel, W. (2005). Mental mechanisms: What are the operations? Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 208-213.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A Mechanistic Alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences , 36, 421-441.

Bechtel, W. and Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Mechanistic explanation and the nature-nuture controversy. Bulletin d'Histoire et d'Epistémologie des Sciences de la Vie

Weiskopf, D. and Bechtel, W. (2004) Remarks on Fodor on Having Concepts, Mind and Language, 19, 48-56

Zawidzki, T. and Bechtel, W. (2004). Gall's Legacy Revisited Decomposition and Localization in Cognitive Neuroscience.  In C. E. Erneling and D. M. Johnson (eds.), Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  For an early conference version of this paper, click here.

Bechtel, W. (2003). Modules, brain parts, and evolutionary psychology. In S. J. Scher and F. Rauscher (eds.) Evolutionary psychology: Alternative approaches. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bechtel, W. (2002). Decomposing the brain: A long term pursuit. Brain and Mind, 3, 229-242.

Bechtel, W. (2002). Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important?Philosophy of Science, 69, S48-S58.

Bechtel, W. (2001). The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research. Minds and Machines, 11, 483-502.

McCauley, R. N. and Bechtel, W. (2001). Explanatory pluralism and the heuristic identity theory. Theory and Psychology, 11: 736-760

Bechtel, W. (2001).  Cognitive Neuroscience: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition.  In P. Machamer, P. McLaughlin and R. Grush (eds). Philosophical Reflections on the Methods of Neuroscience. Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press.

Bechtel, W, Mandik, P., and Mundale, J. Philosophy meets the Neurosciences (2001).  In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel W. & Stufflebeam, R. S. (2001). Epistemic Issues in Procuring Evidence about the Brain:  The Importance of  Research Instruments and Techniques. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. (2001). Linking Cognition and Brain: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Language.  In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. (2001). Decomposing and Localizing Vision: An Exemplar for Cognitive Neuroscience. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. (2001). Representations: From neural systems to cognitive systems.  In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W., Abrahamsen, A., and Graham, G. (2001). Cognitive Science, History. International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier Science

Bechtel, W. (2000). From imaging to believing: Epistemic issue in generating biological data. In R. Creath and J. Maienschein (Eds.), Epistemology and Biology, pp. 138-163. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, W. and McCauley, Robert N. (1999). Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future):   The Mind-Body Problem Against the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience. In M Hahn and S. C. Stoness (eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 67-72.  Mahwah, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Bechtel, W. and Mundale, J. (1999). Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science, 66, 175-207.

Bechtel, W. (1999).  Unity of ScienceMIT encyclopedia of cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Waskan, J. and Bechtel, W. (1998). The scope of cognitive science: A critical notice of Paul Thagard's Introduction to cognitive science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28,

Bechtel, W. (1998). Representations and cognitive explanations: Assessing the dynamicist challenge in cognitive scienceCognitive Science, 22, 295-318.

Bechtel, W., Graham, G. and Abrahamsen, A. (1998). The life of cognitive science.  In W. Bechtel and G. Graham (Eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. and Zawidzki, T. (1998). Selective biographies of major contributors to cognitive science. In W. Bechtel and G. Graham (Eds.), A Companion to Cognitive Science.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bechtel, W. and Mundale, J. (1997). Multiple realizability revisited. Proceedings of the Australasian Cognitive Science Society. This is a much shorter version of Bechtel and Mundale (1999).

Bechtel, W. (1997). Dynamics and decomposition: Are they compatible? Proceedings of theAustralasian Cognitive Science Society.

Stufflebeam, R. S. and Bechtel, W. (1997). PET: Exploring the myth and the method. Philosophy of Science: Supplement.

Waskan, J. and Bechtel, W. (1997). Directions in Connectionist Research: Tractable Computations without Syntactically Structured Representations, Metaphilosophy. (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1997). Embodied Connectionism. In D. Johnson and C. E. Erneling, The future of  the cognitive revolution, pp. 187-208. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (This is available as a postscript file.)

Mundale, J. and Bechtel, W. (1996). Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function, Minds and Machines, 6, 481-505. (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1996). What knowledge must be in the head in order to acquire language. In B. Velichkovsky and D. M. Rumbaugh, eds., Communicating meaning: The evolution and development of langauge. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1996). What should a connectionist philosophy of science look like? In R. N. McCauley, ed., The Churchlands and their critics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1996). Responsibility and decision making in the era of neural networks. Social Philosophy and Policy.

Bechtel, W. (1995). Biological and Social Constraints on Cognitive Processes: The need for dynamical interactions between levels of organization. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 20, pp. 133-164.

Bechtel, W. (1995). Consciousness: Perspectives from Symbolic and Connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1075-1086 (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1995). Deciding on the data. Epistemological Problems Surrounding Instruments and Research Techniques in Cell Biology. In PSA 1994, Volume 2.

Bechtel, W. (1994). Levels of descriptions and explanation in cognitive science. Minds and Machines, 4, 1-25.

Bechtel, W. (1994). Natural deduction in connectionist systems. Synthese 101, 433-463. (This is available as a pdf file.)

Bechtel, W. (1993). Decomposing intentionality: Perspectives on intentionality drawn from language research with two species of chimpanzees. Biology and Philosophy, 8, 1-32.

Bechtel, W. (1993). Knowing how to use language: Developing a rapprochement between two theoretical traditions. In H. Roitblat, L. Herman, & P. Nachtigall (Eds.), Language and communication: Comparative perspective, pp. 65-83. Hillsdale, NJ: E rlbaum.

Bechtel, W. (1993). Integrating disciplines by creating new disciplines: The Case of cell biology. Biology and Philosophy, 8, 277-29

Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. A. (1993). Connectionism and the future of folk psychology. In R. Burton (Ed.) Minds: Natural and Artificial, pp. 69-100. Albany, NY: SUNY University Press. Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner (Eds.), Fol k psychology: Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1993, pp. 340-367.

Bechtel, W. (1993). Currents in connectionism. Minds and Machines, 3, 125-153.

Bechtel, W. (1993). The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies, 71, 119-154

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R. C. (1992). Emergent phenomena and complex systems. In A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim (Eds.) Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism, pp. 257-288. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Verlag.